Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam > Blaise Pascal Instituut > Girard Studiekring > COV&R 2007
Modesty has settled upon the organ of
conviction
Some
comments on truth, tolerance, vulnerability and Erik Borgmans
lecture at COV&R 2007
SIMON
DE KEUKELAERE
Email
Simon.DeKeukelaere@UGent.be
Relativization and the
ambivalences of modernity
In an
article written in honour of Raymund Schwager René Girard once summarized one
of his core convictions as follows:
Not only does the
Judeo-Christian [tradition] hold a truth absent from all myths, but it alone
knows that it possesses this truth.
Nietzsche was right here: no religion vindicates
victims like the Judeo-Christian does.
It is impossible to think that in the
religion of the Incarnation, this superiority could be independent of its
religious dimension. (Girard 2001)
Girard
dares to make this bold claim since he considers vindicating an unjustly
accused victimlike the Judeo-Christian tradition doesto be superior to unjustly accusing ones
neighbour (simply because every one else does) and throwing him or her from a
cliff, whichaccording to mimetic theoryis only one example of the many collective
murders that founded human religions. The Bible and especially the gospels
exhibit the founding event all the myths hide. That is why, in Girards view,
the Judeo-Christian tradition is the only one of its kind, i.e. absolutely
unique.
At the 2007
COV&R conference in Amsterdam Dutch theologian Erik Borgman objected to
Girards claims about the uniqueness and superiority of the Judeo-Christian
tradition, not because he believes those claims to be too Christian, but for
exactly the opposite reason. According to the Dutch theologian those claims go
against the way in which Christianity expresses even the uniqueness all the
religions share.
Christianity is
unique, of course, just as any other religion is unique, but the truth the
Christian tradition claims to reveal is expressed in its relativization of even
this uniqueness. (Borgman 2007)
If we
follow Borgmans logic (any other religion is unique), we must conclude that every exemplar of the class religion
is the only one of its kind. I do not
think that this logical ambivalence bothers Borgman. His lecture in Amsterdam
was after all a theological plea for the return of the ambivalences of
modernity. Borgman makes this pleanot in order to get rid of Christianity,
buton the contraryto stay fully Christian, suggesting that modernity, with
all its ambivalences, is much better and more Christian than we think.
It is not
my intention to criticize this view. It has already been defended a hundred
years ago, and very convincingly so, by G.K. Chesterton. In chapter two of his
masterpiece Orthodoxy Chesterton
writes: The modern world is not evil; in some ways the modern world is far too good. (emphasis mine) Modernity
has not been emptied of Christian virtues and values, as is often heard today.
The modern world is full of the old Christian virtues gone mad.
It is very
interesting, I think, to note that the most important example Chesterton gives
to illustrate his thesis is the dislocation of the virtue of Christian
humility. According to Chesterton humility moved from the organ of ambition
to the organ of conviction.
Humility was
largely meant as a restraint upon the arrogance and infinity of the appetite of
man.
But what we suffer from to-day is humility in the wrong place. Modesty
has moved from the organ of ambition. Modesty has settled upon the organ of
conviction; where it was never meant to be. A man was meant to be doubtful
about himself, but undoubting about the truth; this has been exactly reversed.
(Chesterton 1909)
Now, what
has Chesterton to do with our discussion of Borgmans lecture? In observing
that modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction Chesterton really
foresees todays (post-) modern relativism andmore importantlystresses its
Christian roots, as Borgman does. Chesterton does not, however, explain why
exactly modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction. Why this transplantation and not another one? I think
mimetic theory can lend a hand to elucidate this question. The way in which it
does will help us in our discussion of Borgmans paper.
So, why
has modesty moved to the organ of conviction? In a fascinating article in Contagion Gil Bailie wrote the
following: the term conviction
is rooted in a community's unambiguous
certainty regarding the moral wretchedness of its designated convict. (Bailie 1997, 143)
According to mimetic theory the mobs unanimous
certainty has been mortally wounded on the cross. That is why we can no longer
benefit from the peace of the world as we did before. The Judeo-Christian
tradition initiated the deconstruction of our religious and cultural
constructions build upon our rejected cornerstones, our mimetically designated
convicts.
So, thinkers like Borgman or Gianni Vatimo are
right indeed when they suggest a correlation between Christianity and
relativism. Yet, we need to define (set the limits) of what this connection
exactly is, in order to know what it is not. As I suggested above, Christian
doubt has a very precise target: the violent mobs unanimous certainties.
Christianity is able to put these (false)
convictions in question thanks to an opposite and true conviction, a
head-strong, an uncompromising conviction coming from the cross: the
innocence of the victim.
This firm and true conviction has a religious
importance too. The Judeo-Christian tradition wants us to know that there is a
difference between the gods we have fabricated ourselves and the God who has
nothing to do with our violence. We cannot relativize this difference and the
absolute uniqueness that goes with it in the name of Christianity. Doing so
would indeed be a nice example of a Christian virtue turned mad or to use
Bernanos reformulation of Chestertons phrase: une idée chrétienne devenue
folle, a Christian idea gone mad.
Culturalism
In his
abstract Borgman makes some interesting observations about the rise of a new
culturalism (Borgman 2007a) in our world. To answer
this rise the theologian pleads for a return to the ambivalences of
modernity, as we have already noted above. Surprisingly his critique of
culturalism applies to Girard. In his proposed strategy to stop [todays]
tendency towards violence Girard is a culturalist. (Borgman 2007a) And also:
To counter this, I will stress two aspects of the Christian tradition Girard
virtually neglects. (Borgman 2007a) The second aspect Girard neglects,
according to Borgman, is objective redemption. With this term Borgman refers
to the fact that the foundation of our redemption is not our faith in it, but that what has
happened in and through Jesus. Firstly I do not see why Girard would object to
the idea that what happened in and through Jesus is more important than our
faith in it. Secondly I do not understand why it would not be possible to
stress both ideas at the same time: a personal faith/thrust in Christ and the
idea of objective redemption. And / and, not or / or.
Let us take a look now at the first aspect of the
Christian tradition Girard virtually neglects according to Borgman:
Christianity is not a theory claiming to be absolutely true nor a culture
propagating unflawed values. It is a religion stressing human dependence on
Divine grace. (Borgman 2007a)
According to
Borgman this aspect of Christianity is overlooked by Girard. Yet, having read
Girard, I am sure the French anthropologist would readily agree with the above
statement. Christianity is certainly not a culture according to mimetic
theory. Furthermore Girard has often underlined that Christianity is not a
theory, nor a philosophy, but a religion. In Quand Ces Choses Recommenceront Girard recounts a meaningful
anecdote. One day [Foucault] told me that one should not make a philosophy of
the victim. I replied: Not a philosophy, indeed, but a religion!
but it
already exists! (Girard 1994, 112)
Human
dependence on Divine grace is also one of Girards core convictions, a
principle on which he often insists in his more recent books. If one thinks
Girard does not repeat his thoughts on the subject enough than I could simply
answer that Girard is not a theologian but an anthropologist.
So, in
what sense could Girard still be a culturalist? Borgman quotes from a recent
interview in which Girard says: It is a culture war, yes (Girard 2005). Since
Borgman does not refer to the exact context in which Girard uttered those words
and since the Dutch theologian links this idea to the so-called clash of
civilizations: The
recent discussions on the clash of civilizations, not just on a global scale
but also within the societies of the Western world, give rise to a new culturalism. (Borgman 2007a my
italics) - one might come to believe that in Girards
view you have a clash between the superior (?) West and the other cultures.
That
ishowevernot the case. In the interview the expression culture war refers
to a clash within the west, a clash
between sets of conflicting values, not a clash of civilizations. I quote
from the interview with Gardels:
NPQ:
Doesnt Pope Benedicts crusade against relativism [
] announce a clash within
the West? [
] It is about resisting a culture of materialism and disbelief by
insisting on values, as the Pope has put it, beyond "egoism and
desire." Figuratively, the conflict is between the Pope and Madonna (the
pop singer).
Girard: It is a
culture war, yes. I agree.
In the
interview Girard also refers to the expressions culture of life and culture
of death. But all this has, of course, nothing to do with the popular idea of
the clash of civilizations. When Borgman accuses Girard of being a
culturalist that is really a straw man argument, I think.
It is
nevertheless relevant for our discussion to take a closer look at Borgmans
ideas on violence and culture. This is important because Borgmans theological plea is grounded in anthropological observations on violence
and culture. The fundamental question is thus whether or not these observations
are anthropologically sound and can thus (or cannot) function as a solid basis
for a theological plea.
When the
Dutch theologian develops his anthropological ideas he discusses and applies
mimetic theory. Hence Borgman is able to state that his opposition to Girards
and Pope Benedicts critique of relativism is partly inspired by Girards
theory. At some point in his paper, when he discusses mimetic theory, violence
and culture, Borgman indeed gives a fine critique of some modern presumptions
about violence. In the second paragraph of this discussion he nevertheless
writes something strange about the origin of violence: Not a violent culture
is at the origin of violence, but the very existence of culture, creating a
realm of non-culture as its excluded opposite. (Borgman 2007)
I agree
with the first part of the above sentence and I assume that every culture
somehow produces violence, especially when it thinks it opposes and cures
violence. But the idea that the very existence of culture is at the origin
of violence looks like a rather cheap resuscitation of an old assumption by
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. When things go wrong culture is to blame: the very
existence of culture is at the origin of violence. If mimetic theory has
made anything clear than at least that this assumption is a myth. In Girards
view, mimesis, not culture, is at the origin of violence (Violence is a
by-product of mimesis Girard writes in The
Girard Reader). It is not an insignificant detail, I think, that in
Borgmans (girardian?) analysis of violence and culture the problem of mimetic
desire is never mentioned or discussed.
According
to mimetic anthropology culture is not the cause of violence but on the
contrary a way to contain violence (in the double sense of the word). After
having named what is at the origin of violence Borgman adds what produces
violence: violence is produced by excluding people from civilization (Borgman
2007). Apparently, at this point, Borgman tries to include Girards
scapegoat-mechanism into his thinking on violence. Yet, in Girards theory,
excluding people from civilization is not the starting-point but a violent consequence of violence, a temporary and
unjust solution to it. A solution that founds
and re-founds religions and cultures.
In
Borgmans view culture precedes violence. Since there is a culture / a
civilization there will somehow be a need to exclude people from culture /
civilization. Therefore the very existence of culture is at the origin of
violence. This view is nevertheless very hard to defend, I think, especially
today against the backdrop of the theory of evolution. Culture has not always
been there. Did it fall from heaven and suddenly caused peaceful anthropoids to
become violent beings?
Tolerance
Even if
its corroborating anthropology seems a little naïve to me, Borgmans
theological plea for the return to the ambivalences of modernity could still
be defended as a well-meant recipe for tolerance and non-violence, necessary in
our world today. This would be necessary since thinking out loud that the Judeo-Christian
tradition is superior, like Girard does, will only cause offence to other
religious groups and should thus be avoided.
According
to this view Christians should practise the austere mortification of their core
convictions and be able to sacrifice their Christian identity in the name of
Christianity. Even though Borgman does not explicitly advocate this view of
tolerance it seems his approach suits the aforementioned ascetical
recommendations very neatly. So, in his eyes, it is not a very good thing to
put too much stress on the uniqueness and exclusivity of Jesus as redeemer
(Borgman 2007). Moreover Christianity will show that it does not confess to a
mythological image of the world and itself in its ability to transform and let go of its identity.
(Borgman 2007)
Girard
would not agree with this view, I think. At the end of The Girard Reader he says:
Jesus said, I am
the way, the truth, and the life, and he told his disciples to go into the world
and make converts. If we give that up, are we still Christian? The idea that if
we respect other religions more than our own and act only according to PC peace
will break out all over the world is fantasy and delusion. ... As your faith
grows, the more you empty yourself of rivalry and self-aggrandizement and the
more you feel impelled to communicate to others, with others the truth you have experienced. (Girard 1996, 286-297)
Truth-claims
do not fight, humans do. What I find interesting in the above quote is Girards
reference to the Christian idea of kenosis. He stresses the importance of
emptying oneself of rivalry and self-aggrandizement. It is very significant,
in my view, that when Borgman refers to kenosis in his paper he does not refer
to pride, rivalry, the Self or similar things, but to truth, to the
self-emptying movement truth has, according to the Christian tradition.
(Borgman 2007). In comparing Borgmans application of the idea of kenosis to
Girards application of it I am again reminded of Chesterton. When, in chapter
two of orthodoxy, he writes about the virtue of humility gone mad Chesterton
also adds this: A man
was meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about the truth; this
has been exactly reversed. (Chesterton 1909)
In other words: the self-emptying should be applied to the self ([rivalry and self-aggrandizement
as Girard puts it], not to truth.
This idea of the self-emptying movement truth has is central to
Borgmans thesis, so we should take a closer look at it. Borgman highlights the
importance of this peculiar kind of kenosis:
As I see it, and as
will hopefully become clearer in the course of this lecture, the paradoxical
point of Christianity is [
] its claim that truth [
.] has taken on the form of
relativity and weakness.
(Borgman
2007)
If you believe in the Incarnation truth has no doubt
taken on the form of weakness in a particular (relative, not absolute) time,
place and culture. To say that truth has taken on the form of weakness is however
most visible on the Cross. In Pauls famous hymn in Philippians Chapter 2 (from
which the theological term kenosis is taken) the point of culmination of
Christs self-emptying is the Cross. [Christ] humbled himself, becoming obedient to
death, even death on a Cross. (Phil 2, 8) So, when one applies Borgmans idea
that truth has taken on the form of weakness to the crucifixion it becomes
clear that the word weakness is maybe even a little too weak here. One could
more accurately put it like this: truth has taken on the form of the murdered one.
Why is this nuance significant? Truth in person has
been crucified, not because truth is intrinsically too weak or harmless, but
because it is too strong for us, it could (and it will) deprive us of our most
cherished cultural and personal belongings. Indeed, when a strong man is fully
armed and guards his courtyard, his possessions are safe. But when a stronger
man attacks and overpowers him, he takes the weapons on which he was relying
and divides up his loot. (see Luke 11: 14-23)
Truth, even crucified truth, is not weak. Truth did
not plan its own violent exclusion to please our postmodern sense of tolerance.
The Christian truth has nothing to do with violence. Should we therefore call
it weak? Would that not be lending too much prestige to violence after all?
Violence
and the sacred
As we have
already suggested above the Judeo-Christian revelation has initiated the
deconstruction of some of our most cherished cultural possessions. One of the
most important things the Cross has made impossible is the divinization of our
mimetically designated convicts. We are still able to hate our scapegoats but
we wont turn them into gods anymore.
That is what, according to Girard, Jesus words I saw Satan fall like
lightning from heaven. (Luke 10, 18) refer to. Since we cannot divinize our
victims any longer, the false transcendence has been chased from heaven. As
Nietzsche famously exclaimed in the Antichrist
: Almost two-thousand years and no new god!
This fact
will not simply bring peace to the world, on the contrary. The action of the
Cross has slowly but surely deprived us of the peace of the world that goes
together with the divinization of our victims and the recreation of sacred
order. That is why, according to Girard, Christianity does not promise
immediate peace at all. That is what Girard suggest when he says without
religion societies go to the dogs (quoted in Borgman 2007) Satan falls from
heaven, indeed but he falls on earth, as Girard has often underlined. Since
Satan can no longer cast out Satan mimetic disorder will no longer
automatically recreate order. There is no human solution to our crises anymore,
no magic potion, no pharmakon. That is why the lack of conviction in our
world has apocalyptic consequences, in the sense of revelation but also in the
sense of violence. This idea is strikingly suggested in one of William Butler
Yeats most famous poems: The Second
Coming:
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of innocence is drowned; The best lack all convictions, while the worst Are full of passionate intensity. Surely some revelation is at hand.
Gil Bailies luminous commentary on the term
conviction I quoted above was in fact part of a larger commentary on (two
verses from) this poem. Here we quote from Bailies article more fully:
[The term] conviction
is rooted in a community's unambiguous certainty regarding the moral wretchedness
of its designated convict. What [Yeats] did see was that the
"best" no longer enjoyed the moral luxury of that conviction, while
the "worst" still did. Yeats'
mistakethe misrecognition that lends post-modern deconstruction its moral
plausibilityis that he thought of the two categories as political and moral
opposites. With the help of the vine and branches discourse [in John] and
Girard's mimetic theory, however, we are able to see the mutually intensifying
relationshipat both the social and psychological levelbetween the lack of
conviction and passionate intensity. (Bailie 1997, 143-144)
It is important to stress this mutually intensifying
relationship between the lack of conviction and the passionate intensity.
Since Borgmans perspective lacks this anthropological realism, his
interpretation of the logion I see Satan fall
is far too optimistic, in my
view:
The logion about Satan falling like lightning
from heaven, has to be understood in the same way as the vision at the end of
the book Revelation:
And
I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth
are passed away; and the sea is no more. And I saw the holy city, new
Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven of God, made ready as a bride adorned for
her husband (Rev. 20, 1-2).
[
]
Satan did not fall from heaven once and for all
when Jesus died on the cross, and does not have to be kept from but falls every
time an excluded person is included again, a silenced voice is speaking and
being heard, a victimized person is erected and regaining dignity, a killed
person resurrected and coming to life again. (Borgman 2007)
The addition like lightning suggests a sudden fall,
I think, rather than the at once repetitive (Satan
falls every time an
excluded person is included again) and slowly continuous thing Borgman
describes: Satan is in the process of falling from heaven. (Borgman 2007). As
I suggested, it is more consistent to link the logion about Satan falling, to
Nietzsches exclamation Almost two thousand years and no new god! without
forgetting Girards idea that the fact that we can no longer divinize our
victims also means that the peace of the
world will forever flee us. Satan has fallen
on earth.
Borgman misses this point, I believe, since there is
too much of an ideology of the victim in his view. So the theologian writes:
Redemption can only mean that no-one will be
excluded and everybody is part of the good life. (Borgman 2007)
And also:
God is with those excluded,
that is the ultimate claim of the Christian tradition. But the point of being a
Christian is not believing with an absolute faith that this is absolutely true,
but that what is truly absolute is found
with what is excluded. (Borgman 2007, my emphasis)
I have some difficulties
with the conclusion of the above quote: what is truly absolute is found with
what is excluded. This sentence encapsulates most of the caricatures of
Christianity in our world. In I see Satan
Girard suggested that le souci moderne des victimes is the only absolute
in our post-modern world. What is truly absolute is found with what is
excluded. If we heed this maxim then even the most resentful and asinine
causes will gain credibility and prestige as long as its champions will come
forward as the excluded.
It would be a good thing, I
believe, if Christians kept in mind Niezsches idea of the slave-morality and
his critique of Christianity as the religion of resentment. Niezsche
undoubtedly took the caricature for the real thing. Christians should be
careful not to make the same mistake.
REFERENCES
Bailie, G. 1997. The Vine and the Branches Discourse: The Gospels
Psychological Apocalypse. In Contagion 4 (Spring): 120-146
Borgman, E. 2007. The Weak
Presence of Grace.A Theological Plea for the Return to the Ambivalences of
Modernity. COV&R 2007 Paper
Borgman, E. 2007a. The Weak
Presence of Grace.A Theological Plea for the Return to the Ambivalences of
Modernity. COV&R 2007 Abstract
Chesterton, G. K., 1993. Orthodoxy.
Ignatius Press,
Girard, R. with
Oughourlian, J-M. & Lefort, G., 1987b. Things
Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. Translated by S. Bann and M. Metteer.
Stanford University Press, Stanford, Ca.
Girard, R. Quand ces choses commenceront, entretiens
avec Michel Treguer. Arléa, diffusion Le Seuil,
Paris
Girard, R.,
1996. The Girard Reader. Edited by
James G. Williams. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996.
Girard, R.
1999. Je vois Satan tomber comme léclair.
Grasset,
Paris
Girard, R. 2001. Celui par qui le scandale arrive. Desclée de Brouwer, Paris
|
|
|
|