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Abstracts Papers
Paolo Barbaro
Who Cares about the
Yasukuni Shrine? Reflections on Tolerance Issues and System Vulnerability in
Modern Japan
Email - Profile - Subtheme # 2 - Abstract
PAPER
The
theoretical and comparative contribution of research on contemporary Japan for
studies on the socio-political systems commonly defined as modern or
post-modern, is potentially very enriching and valuable. Japan is in fact a
strong and polyvalent theoretical tool to understand the social mechanics,
forces and factors which underlie many contemporary issues of post-modern
societies. The theoretical importance of Japan resides in what we could call,
borrowing a biological concept, an evolutionary relay: the development of
similar traits by systems with different history. Sharing a high number of
common features with the richest and most industrialized (or post-industrial)
countries in the world, Japan is yet the only country of the G8 and of the
self-proclaimed first (or developed) world that has clearly a different
historical and cultural background, while having a political agenda set on
issues such as immigration, tolerance and terrorism.
In the last
ten years, the Japanese society has been facing a number of problems which are
very similar to some occurring in the western Europe and in the USA: immigrants
with integration problems, the corrosion of social institutions and pillars of
the self-image, and a consequent rise in insecurity and re-discussion of
identity; a rise in political murders of eminent representatives, and in
general political violence; a growing popularity of the extreme right point of
view; terrorist attacks against civil targets with a high symbolic and
potential-casualty impact.
Thanks to
its cultural and historical specificities, the Japanese system is a most
advantageous comparative referent when compared to western societies to
abstract rough social and historical data, with the objective of inferring laws
and understand the functions, value and mechanisms of vulnerability. The study
of the Japanese system can strongly contribute, on a theoretical level, to
broaden the perspective on a number of related contemporary issues, including
religious tolerance, ethnicity in post-modern society, definition of a
vulnerable system, emergent factors leading to aggressions. Analysing the Japanese
system is also useful for the de-construction of ethnic and ethnocentric
categories which are latent in many existing theoretical researches, a
characteristic probably due to the dominance of approaches focused on
contemporary American and European issues, such as the issues of Muslim
integration in Europe or Islamic fundamentalism.
The
development of theoretical frameworks on system vulnerability of contemporary
post-industrial societies has to confront with, and include, Japanese material:
an explanation of vulnerability in post-modern societies which fails to include
Japan has to be considered incomplete.
Japan as a complex system
Arguably, its not possible to define what is the Japanese system
without engaging in a description and analysis of socio-cultural, economical or
political aspects of contemporary Japanese society, which would take an
enormous energy and would risk to be overwhelming, missing the aim of the
present study. Furthermore complicating the search for comprehension, there are
three kinds of obstacles in our way. First, a number of important theoretical
issues remain unsolved, such as the definition of Japanese modernity[1],
or the lack of a critical and collective reflection on Japan recent past[2].
Secondly, many linguistic referents which are central for our analysis, as for
example terrorism, modernity, democracy, Japanese system, or vulnerability, are
polysemantic, and this is very problematic for a proper structuring of a
rational and logically coherent discourse. Finally, this study, having
interdisciplinary aspiration, is complicated by the existence of methodologies
(belonging to various disciplines) diverging in tools, underlying philosophy
and scope. To avoid the potential impasses of inadequate descriptive language,
of an apparently chaotic or overwhelming subject and material of analysis, and
of diverging and sometimes contrasting methodologies, a compelling argument needs to be made for reductionism.
These reflections
are major reasons in favour of the use of complex system analysis for a
discussion on the vulnerability of the Japanese society, hoping that such an
approach may introduce a reductive holistic vision of the studied matter,
without engaging in an overly holistic narrative. Moreover, this kind of
analysis has not been used yet for the study of the Japanese system, and may
shed light or bring a new perspective for both the understanding of Japan and
of contemporary societies. However, complexity theories are not a uniform body of scientific interpretation.
The use of the concept of complexity in different sciences has led to a
diversification of the employ of the word, and to its application to dissimilar
procedures and theoretical frameworks, some of which have also been declared
unscientific[3]. It is therefore necessary,
before getting to the actual analysis, to explain the kind of methodology that
I intend to use in the present paper, to avoid misunderstandings and misuses of
terminology, and to proceed in a coherent, logical and rational in one word
scientific way.
The
contemporary Japanese system, which for simplicity Ill consider synonym of the
Japanese nation, is a nestled network, and therefore complex by definition,
since its composed by the overlapping and interaction of systems which are
themselves universally accepted as complex networks (the Japanese society or
the Japanese economy, for example). It shows likewise all the main
characteristics of complexity: its clearly nonlinear,
in the sense that its behaviour is not the simple sum of the behaviour of its
components. Moreover, the macro-system has evident characteristics which are
not presents in its components. Its a dynamic system, and one subject to feedback loops. Its evolving and it has
memory. Finally, it is adaptive, i.e. it changes depending on environmental and
historical conditions. As a preliminary fundamental note, we should notice that
the nonlinearity of a system makes it react in differing ways to the same kind
of occurrence, depending on the history of the system and on other variables: a
fact (or a state) can generate effects which are much greater than the actual
occurrence (the so-called butterfly effect); it can have consequences which are
proportional to its power, and still the same event can produce minor
consequences, even just extinguishing itself without being noticeable.
Objectives of the present paper: a search for
bifurcation and emergent factors
The main
objective of the present paper is to continue the reflection, started in many
other places, on the vulnerability of Japan, and of contemporary systems in
general. I intend to discuss both the factors that contribute to vulnerability
in a post-modern society, and how they interact. I hope to give a modest
contribution to answer questions like: how vulnerable is the contemporary
Japanese system? Which are its vulnerable points, and why? What is the social
consciousness of its vulnerability and threats? Which actors sustain or oppose
vulnerability, why and how? Keeping these objectives and questions in mind, I
decided to structure the paper as a series of reflections on a sample of
factors which play a role in the vulnerability of the Japanese system. Before
getting there, however, Ill discuss more generally the concept of weakness of
a system.
Im not
aiming, in the present paper, at proposing a finished model of the Japanese
system or of its vulnerability, neither Im aiming to propose a complete
forecasting or modelling system to judge systems vulnerability. The models
which will be suggested are not exhaustive, but propositional or analytical.
Every system is vulnerable
Generally
speaking, every system is vulnerable, with different degrees, and depending on
time and spatial scales. In particular, social systems are intrinsically
vulnerable, since they are ever mutating systems that depend on a number of
different agents, constructions and rules, which have differing objectives,
natures, principles, conscience and power. The resulting apparent equilibrium,
actually a tendency to equilibrium, is based on the balance of opposing and
cooperating forces, which change over time generating crisis (but also often
their resolutions).
Vulnerability
is a passive quality which has its active counterpart in the concept of threat,
and can result in harm of the system or of its components. We should consider
that harm can be made resulting in the strengthening or bettering of the system
as a whole, or of its features: immunology offers plenty of examples in this
direction. Furthermore, social systems often have ways to harm some of its
components (individuals or organizations) in order to protect the system itself
or some of its elements. We need therefore to consider an approach that
includes these system dynamics, using a method to measure the effects of
threats on the system as a whole and over time. I therefore suggest to
conceptualise vulnerability by measuring harm, intended as the worsening of the
system. To implement the notion of a worsening system, I suggest the
construction of a model of social systems as composed by four basic
constituents: mass, reproductive capacity, quality and efficiency. Such an
approach should help us to empirically judge vulnerability from the systems
point of view, including in the evaluation of damage both the harm to the
systems components and to the totality of the system. It goes in fact without
saying that theres a limit of harm that the components can endure before the
entire system gets affected.
The mass of
a social system M is the system from
a quantitative point of view. The mass of a system can be thought as
constituted by four elements: demography, the social capital, the systems
wealth and power. The demographical factor D
is an indicator of the rapport of the total population 
, with its age distribution 
, and the general fertility rate 
, which could be expressed as: D = */.
The social
capital is the sum of formal knowledge (or education) and informal knowledge.
The Education Index used to calculate the Human Development Index may be
employed to determine formal knowledge. Informal education includes all the
notions normally comprised in the anthropological definition of culture, such
as the knowledge of the natural environment, of local geography, of the system
and its rules. It is evident that the awareness of social rules and customs, or
of the group environment, is a variable with proportional effects over the
individual contribution to the groups well-being. Informal knowledge is not
the same for all the members of a society, and societies dont have a same
average level of informal knowledge. Migrations, urbanization and wars, among
other factors, can greatly alter the quality and/or quantity of informal
knowledge. Discussing the measuring of informal knowledge is a long matter not
relevant to the paper. Ill indicate it as 
. The total knowledge 
may be thought as: = EI *.
The power,
or strength, of a system, is the quantity of energy (human, material, military
and technological) that the system can rely upon in a given moment. It should
be calculated considering at least the following factors: the total working
force of the system, its military capacities, its technologies, its energetic
production, its energetic resources, its transportation system. Again, being
this variable difficult to calculate, and being such a task not directly
related to the present study, it wont be tried here. Ill indicate the power
of a system as 
.
By wealth
of a system, 
, I intend the economic, and all the other non-energetic and
non-human resources of a system: its GDP may be used as a base to calculate the
Wt, but it needs to be integrated with indicators of the production
potentiality, of natural resources, and of the sustainability of the system.
Moreover, before the total wealth of a system can be calculated, it needs to be
put in relation with what we may call wealth accessibility, which is the
capacity of the system to use and control the wealth produced by its
constituent elements. The wealth accessibility is related to a number of
factors, including the geography of production, the transportation system, the
owning of wealth, the forms of control and distribution of property.
The
reproductive capacity of a social system 
is measurable by the amount
of information, organizations and institutions, belonging to the mesa- and
micro-level, of both material and symbolic nature, that are passed on from one
generation to another. This characteristic of the system is mainly related to
its socio-cultural and biological aspects. In the passage of culture from
generation to generation, a part of the original information are always lost,
and parts are regenerated in new shapes and contents. This quantity is of
difficult calculation, and it changes depending on historical factors. As far
as the majority of culture is passed on to the next generation, including the
changes (linguistic, cultural etc.) that always occur, the system is alive and
performing well from a reproduction point of view. Similarly, from a biological
point of view, the main important factor is that genes (and their mutations)
are passed on to the next generation. The contribution of genetic material or
of technologies from outside of the system is an enrichment and a strengthening
factor.
The quality
of a social system 
consists in its
ontological purpose: the capacity of satisfying the spiritual and material
needs of the human beings composing it. Its interesting to notice that often
the augmentation of living standards is proportional to the rise of
vulnerability of the system, since bettering can result in a more probable
worsening. We could consider, when calculating the quality of a social
organization, to include indicators of the distribution of wealth (an important
value in social stability and welfare), as well as the indicator of subjective
well-being and of life-satisfaction developed by the researchers of the World
Values Survey[4].
The
functionality of the system 
is the evaluation of its
internal organization and efficiency. It is related to four concepts: capacity
of adapting of the system as a whole, and of its components; capacity of action
in the interest of the system or of its components; forms of communication and
communication efficacy among components of the system; cohesion of the system.
Some indicators of the functionality of a social-system may be the system
capacity of adapting to new situations (social, economical, environmental
etc.); its transportation and communication technologies and infrastructures;
its capacity of response against calamities.
Considering
the state of a social system in a given moment as 
, a damage is such if its action results in 
< , where is the state of the
system before the threat started its action, and the state after the
effects of the changes due to the threat are measured. It is also important to
consider the impact of a threat, measuring its effects over time (, ... 
), and considering the average state of the system 
= (
)/n. If < < we would say that the system has reacted to the threat or
recovered from damages: the higher the difference between and , the more traumatic the impact.
Origins of vulnerability
Threats can
be external, internal, perceived and real. These four characteristics may
coexist in the same threat: menaces can be thought as polythetic classes having
characteristics belonging to one or more of the above categories. Internal
threats are characteristics of the system (structural, dynamical, emergent
etc.) which can affect it negatively. External threats are agents exterior to
the system. Typical examples are a military aggression from another country or
an earthquake. External and internal threats can be related (have, for example,
the same geopolitical origin), they can cooperate to harm the system, but they
can also work one against the other, like an epidemic affecting both the people
of a society and an invading army. Catastrophe theory furnishes a number of
laws and case-scenarios of relations, co-action, identity or contrasts of the
causes of harm.
Perceived
threats are very important too, because information can generate consequences
disregarding truthfulness. Witch hunting is an example of damages created by a
perceived internal threat which had no actual foundations. Finally, actual
threats are states or agents of all kinds, which constitute a real danger of
damage for the system, whether they are perceived or not.
Identity and Ethnicity
A factor
playing a fundamental role in the construction of a social system is the
structuring of identity. The discourses on identity are related to a number of
issues, such as tolerance toward foreigners, legislation on immigrations and
the integration of immigrants, nationalism, and more generally the definition,
understanding and tolerance of the Other. The dominant meta-speech defining
Japanese identity is racial and mythological: it proposes an idealized image of
all Japanese people descending from common (and divinized) ancestors, and
belonging to one, big family (the nation of Japan)[5].
According to this dominant mythology of a homogeneous nation (tanitsu minzoku kokka), a Japanese is an individual
ethnically Japanese (i.e. whose parents are both ethnically Japanese and who
shows certain ethnic features[6]),
born and raised in Japan, who shares the linguistic and cultural background of
a Japanese.
This
mythological paradigm of uniqueness nourishes an idealised image of Japanese
identity, which is implemented toward a corpus of laws. Japanese nationality is
based on jus sanguinis, and on an
exclusive principle that doesnt contemplate double nationality. At the age of
twenty-two, people with double or multiple nationality are obliged to abandon
their other nationality if they want to be Japanese, or theyll loose their
rights to Japanese citizenship. The legal implementation of an idealised
identity poses enormous obstacles for the integration of immigrants. The
history of the Korean community is an archetypical example[7].
The combination of migratory fluxes following the Japanese annexing of Korea at
the beginning of the 19th century, and the Korean war in the 1950s,
created in Japan a population of about 600000 people of Korean origin which,
for many decades until the 1980s, has been the only relevant community of
foreigners in Japan[8]. Never granted the
Japanese nationality, the third and fourth generation of Koreans, often
completely assimilated to Japanese culture, reside in Japan with the status of
special permanent residents (tokubetsu eijusha), and even if today they are less subject to discrimination
than theyve historically been, they still are a minority without right to
vote. This characteristic of Japanese society is a threat to the system for a
number of reasons: it raises the level of perceived threat and insecurity, it
impeaches the spiritual and material development of a part of the population,
it creates resentment, it can generate violent and criminal social deviance
among the excluded.
Race is
also a discriminative principle funding more recent immigration laws. In 1990
the so-called Nikkeijin [ethnically
Japanese], descendents of Japanese people who emigrated abroad from the
beginning of the 1900s, were allowed right to residence and right to work in
Japan. This choice has created another group of discriminated permanent
residents. Mainly Brazilians, but also coming from other countries (especially
South American), Nikkeijin are scarcely integrated in Japanese society, and
often nourish a dream of return to their home countries. They generally work in
the so-called three K jobs (kitsui,
difficult, kitanai, dirty, and kiken, dangerous), and have no right of
citizenship[9]. The second generation of
returned Nikkeijin have, on an average, a lower literacy and higher dropping
of school than their Japanese counterpart, a higher rate of crime, and are
often poorly integrated in Japanese society. The model of non-integration of
the Koreans seems to be repeating with the new waves of immigrants, and
although a number of actions have been taken by the authorities[10],
the ideological basis of discrimination race, and the problems generated,
remain.
The general
perception of the foreigner as a threat, in the form of a potential criminal or
of an element menacing order and peace, is very evident in contemporary
Japanese society. In the last year, the idea of a deterioration of the security
in the country has spread, augmented by the media and by many politicians[11],
and it has found a scapegoat in the concept of foreigners crimes. According
to a recently released survey of the Interior Cabinet Office[12]
conducted in January 2007 on 3000 people, the idea that Japan has become less
safe than it was ten years ago is popular. Among the interviewed people, 55.1%
answered that the causes of the worsening public order is the increase in
crimes committed by foreigners.
It seems
that the forms of confrontation with the Other inside and outside the system,
whether the confrontation is politically organised or spontaneous, rely
strongly on the definition of Us (and of I), and in the case of Japan tend to
be of soft exclusion and ideological rejection. We can identify in the
discourse on I and the Other a clear bifurcation[13],
with greatly different outcomes. Although acceptance and refusal of the foreign
element are underground discourses always alive, also depending on other
factors (e.g. economics and class division), and which are not extinguishable
in any society, it is unmistakable that the characteristics of the discourse on
Japan-ness is a major cause of Japanese societys difficulties in integrating
the foreign elements. This characteristic had, and continues to have, a very
negative impact on the system.
On nationalism
What is the
relationship between Japanese identity definition and nationalism? Intuitively,
it is clear that theres a connection between the micro- and mesa-level
understanding and implementing of the idea of Us, and the systems behaviours
at the macro-level. A linear equation can be established between certain
political actions of a nation and its peoples political activity. However,
political movements have low participation in Japan, compared to other
post-modern countries, and anyway the correspondence between peoples opinions
and national policies is often arguable. Lets consider for a moment Sakais
observations on Japanese post-war nationalism: Instead of oppressing the
nationalistic feeling, the American administration of occupation [after the second
world war] has flattered the sense of singularity and of continuity of Japan,
and has helped to delete the colonial guilt [
] together with its
responsibility in the war. This [
] strategy [
] is perfectly symbolised by the
fact that the imperial system has been rebuilt as an integrative part of the
American domination in eastern Asia.[14]
Whether one agrees or not with this
analysis, it is undeniable that the emperor, as a symbol, has been used to
foster national unity for the rebuilding of post-war Japan. As it happened in
other periods of Japanese history, the figure of the emperor has constituted a
mask of dignity and a symbol of continuity placed on a body of changes,
policies and interests. The mythology on Japanese uniqueness, basically the same
of the pre-war period, has not been discussed but recycled. Also, it is evident
that, however strong Japanese peoples love for their country may have been in
the last sixty years, it hasnt had any major effect in foreign politics, as
shown by the presence of the US military bases, very unwanted by virtually
everybody but unmoveable.
Since the
seventies, a great energy has been put in peaceful and productive cultural
activities concerned with the re-discussion of Japanese identity in domains
like leisure[15], producing a great amount
of culture and sociality focused on identity related issues, from the popular
groups of study[16], to an enormous
literature and performing arts, to forms of religion. On the other hand, Japan
has never faced a re-discussion of its pre-war ideological basis, and the
persistence of a racial mythology at the heart of Japanese nationalism is
definitely a vulnerable point of the system. The system avoids a confrontation
with its recent past, with collective history and its historiography: ignorance
is an impediment to many kinds of social progress. A basic idea that should be
discussed but is usually avoided is the fact that, the mythological premises
still constructing todays Japanese national identity, in a different age and
with different historical circumstances, have been the propeller together
with militaristic and imperialist ideology, millions of lives and the suffering
of too many more of the bloodiest war that Japan has ever fought. This form
of nationalism is perceived as a threat or a provocation in neighbouring
countries, and is becoming a powerful instrument in the hand of opposite
nationalists, and a source of tension between countries. It is clear that this
fact are a threat to stability in the Asian region[17]
and to Japanese security, and that the Japanese press, the academic world, and
many political institutions and officials, have heavy responsibilities in this
situation[18]. Prime ministers and
high representatives visits to the Yasukuni shrine[19],
which is a reason of controversy because it enshrines among others some
Class A war criminals, is a constant source of friction with China, the Koreas
and other Asian countries[20].
Similar issues, related to the reportedly government-approved revisionist
contents of history books, initiated in 2005 street protests in some important
cities of China, including assaults of Japanese properties and destruction of
Japanese symbols, and provoked a general a rising of tension between the two
countries. The discussion on national history,
cannot but take place at the meso- and macro-level of the system: in the
schools and universities, among intellectuals, inside political parties, on the
media, in the government. Issues such as the historiography of the second world
war and its teaching in school, and a general re-discussion of national
identity, are a turning point to lower Japanese systems vulnerability and
self-damaging through destructive nationalism and a racially constructed
identity.
The system,
or some of its components, show a good level of resistance to such discussions.
The political movements which work actively to construct a nationalistic Japan,
extreme-right movements, called in Japanese uyoku,
are the emblem of the potential threats of nationalism and of the always existing
mythology at its basis. Although they are divided in a number of different and
competing groups, uyoku groups
generally agree on, and rally behind, the notion of Japanism [Nihon-shūgi], a form of racial
nationalism, and the emperor-theory [Tenno-shūgi], the idea of putting the Emperor back in the centre
of an ideal political-national-religious stage, a theory which implies that any
action done for him is good and acceptable. Although activists constitute a
small minority which dont represent the average political thought and action
of Japanese people[21],
they tend to be dominant, and truly manage to obstacle the re-discussion of
delicate issues. In 1990 Hitoshi Motoshima, the mayor of the city of Nagasaki,
was shot because he had affirmed that Emperor Hirohito was partially
responsible for the war. Similar
reasons are behind more recent attacks against journalists and
politicians, such as the arson of the
home lawmaker Koichi Katōs mother the 15th of March 2006, or
the attack with Molotov cocktails against the Tokyo siege of the
newspaper Nikkei in July of the same year. Such actions are particularly
visible and effective because Japan has a very low number of violent crimes[22],
and also because they are virtually the only forms of political violence existing
in the country.
Mythologies
The role of
mythology, intended as a secondary
semiotic system which, differently from primary communication systems, proposes
signification as the third term of the semantic triangle[23],
is fundamental in understanding the ways that socio-cultural organism
functions, and how they react to stimuli, changes and events. Every
social-system has its own Mythologies[24].
They can constitute amplifying (positive and negative) feedback loops[25]
similar to those studied in economics and behavioural finance. They can
generate great social energy in the form of mass actions, mass reactions,
social movements and social opinions, culture, uprising, social consciousness
etc. Mythologies are a fundamental component to the developing of a system
vulnerability and to other related issues (aggressiveness, social cohesion
etc.). Mythologies are not only constructed for internal use, and the
presentation of ones identity and geo-social space to the Other is usually
imbedded with mythological traits, as the efforts to picture Japanese heroism
and samurai spirit to justify the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
show. The discourse on the Self can be influenced or used by the meta-speeches
or other factors produced outside the system,
as shown by the history of labour movement and internal politics after
the war, clearly shaped by the external geo-political situation[26].
Exchange of symbols and meta-discourses is an always-present characteristic of
inter-cultural dynamics. Since Marco Polos first reports on the existence of
Cipango[27],
the most East and richest of the countries, where there was reportedly so
much gold that the palace of the king were completely covered (inside and
outside) with two fingers of it[28],
Japan has been the repository of opposite visions of the Asian Other: place of
richness and barbarianisms, of a natural and pure form of religion and of
idolatry, and more recently, it has become the place where one can find ancient
wisdoms lost everywhere else, but also the nation with the most perverted forms
of post-modernism. The dehumanization of the Other is the first step for the
worst atrocities, which starts with the Mythological discourses on the
non-human or sub-human qualities of the Other: we should always be attentive and
reactive when such discourses are heard, enunciated or reported. Todays
movements of depiction of Japan as a the old enemy which doesnt admit and
doesnt ask to be forgiven for its tremendous crimes in China, are as
preoccupant signs of as the positions of nothing happened, and fighting for
the emperor is good anyway in Japan.
Millenarianism
In June
1867, the rumour that amulets of the Ise shrine were falling from the sky
spread among Japanese commoners, and a carnivalesque movement with religious and
upheaval features, including mass pilgrimages, the seizure of rich peoples
mansions, and orgiastic behaviours, spread all over the country. This movement,
named eejanaika [literally: isnt it
good?] after a song which was popular among the carnival pilgrims, lasted
about one year. Many interpreted the raining amulets as a sign of the ending of
the world, and they were not completely wrong. In fact, the world they were
used to live in was about to finish. The political and social system of the Edo
period (1600-1868), which had lasted for more than two centuries, virtually
shutting Japan from the rest of the world, would end in 1868, and the country
would soon face great political, social and cultural changes, including the
introduction of western technology, industrialization, urbanization and the
first colonial wars (1894).
The eejanaika was the widest of many social
events with millenarian characteristics which took place at the end of the Edo
period. Millenarian movement are very strong agents of change, and may also
rise the level of perceived vulnerability of the system. Millenarianism is an
emergent feature, linked with the perception of precariousness or of
inadequateness (of the society, of its conditions etc.) and with very visible
effects of amplifying feedback.
The most
visible of millenarian perceptions since the Second World War, as been the
attack with sarin gas in the Tokyo metro, the 20th of March 1995,
when eight adepts of a religious sect called Ōmu shinri-kyō, released quantities of the poisonous gas
in eight different trains during Monday morning rush hours, killing twelve
people and injuring hundreds. The reasons of the attacks have not been
completely explained yet, but what is important to understand is the context
that brought such actions to happen, and its effects. It seems clear that the
perception of threats to the system, or of degeneration of society, is a
fundamental element in the triggering of millenarian constructions. The fact
that among the adepts of the Ōmu
shinri-kyō and among the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks there
were young and middle-aged intelligent and cultivated people, coming from the
best universities of the country, and with good possibility of choice for their
future in front of them, has been a matter of long discussions. Their actions
and choices show are a statement of the obvious fact that the incredible wealth
accumulated, and the living standard reached in Japan, does not imply
necessarily the happiness of its inhabitants. The terrorist attacks in Tokyo
metro are not isolated facts, but symptoms of a social problems and discomfort,
which are confirmed by other indexes, such as a high rate of suicides[29]
and of karōshi, the death for
overworking.
Overusing
the word Millenarianism, we can indicate with it all those movements internal
to the system, but also those states of the system, which starting from a
perceived threat, act to destroy, change or renew the system. Revolutions and
political uprising are millenarian in this sense, although their theology is
humanistic, rational or idealistic. Nationalist movements of extreme-right too
are millenarian, although not humanistic. Millenarian actions are fractures in
the system, and agents of traumatic changes. They show that a breaking point
has been reached and surpassed: a good theoretical model of a society should be
able to forecast them. The output of a millenarian act can be easily evaluated
since they can change the mass of the system, and some other basic
characteristics, such as the perceived vulnerability.
On tolerance
Tolerance
is a very wide concept when applied to societies. Although many sciences or
their branches (e.g. engineering, catastrophe theory, psychology), have
conceptualized tolerance and have constructed models of tolerance levels and
rupture points for different kinds of systems, the application of the concept
of tolerance to a social system is tricky. Social tolerance is certainly an important factor related to the vulnerability of a
system, since it determines the systems reaction to a number of cases, such as
for example social deviance, foreign elements, non-tolerated customs and the
regulation of many aspects of human nature. However, when speaking of a
tolerant society, whether in Japan, Europe or the Americas, we usually refer to
a society were the best ideals of the Humanistic philosophies developed in
Europe since the Renaissance are implemented. Often, when journalists and
sociologists ask to themselves how tolerant should our system be, they reduce
the issue to tolerance toward immigrants, homosexuals, drug users, criminals.
In other words, most of the socially defined liminals. However, such a point of
view is methodologically very limited for our purposes of understanding the
relationship between tolerance and a social system. Although Im a convinced
assertor of Humanism, the division between the political implementation of
ideals from the analytical understanding of socio-political systems remains
fundamental. Being our objective to understand threats, breaking points or
fractures in a social system, and their consequences, we must consider the
concept of tolerance simply as the ability, willingness, or capacity to
tolerate[30], in a broader perspective
which embraces the entirety of the system and its components, and not only
those aspects which are politically contingent. If we imagine, for example, a
system which is tolerant to incest[31],
we would declare it very vulnerable to genetic diseases. A system may be
tolerant to poverty, high disparity in the distribution of wealth, or
ecological degradation, as our contemporary world system is, with the evident
results of non-sustainability and high vulnerability in the long term. There is
a linear rapport between tolerance and vulnerability in specific cases, often
similar to the rapport between social tolerance of non-hygiene behaviours and
infections (or the breaking point of an epidemic). In this sense, therefore,
tolerance is not always a positive feature.
Keeping
these premises in mind, understanding how is tolerance implemented (or opposed)
in Japan becomes a matter of dividing it in groups of logically coherent
elements. Today, major freedoms (speech, cult etc.) and human rights are
generally granted to all the people on Japanese territory, both citizens and
not, with some exceptions[32],
and this favours social peace and what I indicated above as an essential part
to evaluate a system, its quality. From a gender point of view, Japanese
society is relatively liberal in sexual customs although its constructed on
sexist premises. Its obvious that the systems quality is strictly related to
gender issues. For example, we can easily affirm, without fear of being wrong,
that only through the emancipation of women, which implies for instance the
freedom to have right of choice for matters concerning ones own life, the
systems quality can obtain higher levels.
Religious
tolerance is another historical trait of Japanese culture. The country has
known no religious wars and relatively little religious persecution[33],
with the major exception of the anti-Christian laws and persecutions which,
from the beginning of the 17th century until the end of the Edo
period (1600-1868), banned the Christian cult, mainly as a consequence of
political activities, and of the political characteristics of catholic
missionaries in the country. Japan has known, from the 1870s, and increasingly
until the end of the Second World War, a series of policies forcing
nationalistic and illiberal principles on religious institutions and
traditions. The constitution imposed by the Allied Occupation Authority at the
end of the Second World War grants religious freedom, and asserts the division
between state and religion, although indirect links and ties between political
power(s) and remains. Theres probably no need to remind the damaging effects
that such religious policies have had, including (but not limiting to) the
limitation of religious and personal freedoms, the increasing of
ultra-nationalism, and during the war the justification of the worst crimes.
What is interesting to notice is the fact that, even before such visible harms
happened, these policies were damaging the reproductive capacity of the system,
forcibly diminishing and simplifying a great, rich and syncretic religious tradition[34].
History and historicism
How are we
to interpret the historical specificities of Japan? We know that in complex
systems history is important, and determines the future states of the system
itself. On the other hand, trying to determine the future of a social system
from its history, one clearly risks to fall into the extremes of historicism or
historical determinism. Short term forecasts have more probability to be
accurate.
How can defeat
in one war suppress for so long Japans samurai spirit? intoned George Liska,
a European-born, American theorist of international politics[35].
The samurai rhetoric is of mythological origin, but deeply believed inside and
outside Japan, and therefore a relevant factor in the study of this country.
Historically speaking, in Japan samurai have always been a social minority[36],
and even during the centuries when they were at the top of the power, popular
culture was focused on completely other topics, and not interested or
particularly influenced by the rhetoric and culture of the bushi-dō[37],
as the great cultural production of the Edo period (1600-1868) clearly shows.
The discourses stating that the real Japanese soul is the samurai soul are more
recent, often datable after the encounter with the west, but they are well and
alive, in Japan as well as outside it. It is undeniable that the long tradition
of neo-Confucianism (especially during the Edo period), together with a modern
rhetoric of the collective effort and individual renunciation, and the
idealization of ancient facts, have created an ideology of the Samurai nation
which, much is newer than most people believe. Remaining in the scientific
sphere, we could get inspiration from Confucius notion of rectifying names: the
bushi-dō should be called a
mythological discourse on Japanese culture, and not the spirit of the Japanese
people. We need to distinguish the symbolic value of history, which is used and
consumed in the Mythological speeches, and its actual scientific value for the
modelling of social systems, which can be measured with social, economical,
cultural and other indexes.
A major
historical change is signed by the end of the Second World War, a key
turn-point in Japanese history, as well as in the world history. Hiroshima and
Nagasaki atomic bombing, the only nuclear bombing ever targeting a civil
population, symbolically sign the beginning of the cold war, and the
establishment of the USA as the new superpower on the world scale. The burden
of Second World War is still great and heavy in contemporary Japan: its
visible in the constitution almost imposed by the Allied Occupying Authority,
in a military alliance with the USA and in a important presence of US troops in
Japan, in a collective unsolved trauma with recent past.
Some more reflections
Socio-political systems need to be studied considering
the rapport with their geopolitical surroundings. What I defined in the
previous pages as external threats, are often of geopolitical nature. Japan, for example, risks to be
trapped in an eventual confrontation between the United States and China. In
brief and simplifying, the growing economical and military power of China,
together with Japanese nationalism and with American interests in having an
armed Japan as a balance to Chinese power and influence, has already triggered
a re-arming of Japan[38].
In the long term, it may even cause a military confrontation, induced by a
perception of threat in Japan (or in China), by conflict over resources and policies[39].
The signs are worrying: the recent formation of a Ministry of Defence, the
discussions on the necessity of nuclear arming following North Korean missile
tests and nuclear tests, and the debate on the re-writing or re-interpretation
of the ninth article of the constitution, which claims that Japan is a nation
voted to pacifism.
When
studying the vulnerability of a nation, we should take into account its
political system, the distribution of (economical and political) power in a
society, the participation to collective decision. The mythology of nation is,
for example, often used to justify interests and actions of differing natures
and of different power groups, and for this to happen certain political and
power prerequisites are necessary. The results are clear: in pre-war Japan,
intellectual, economical, military and political elites can be identified as
main responsible for actively engaging in the promotion of militarism, racism,
colonialism and imperialist wars.
Some other
factors which should be considered are simple historical and economical
figures. Japanese economy strongly relies on exterior trade for its wealth.
Beside being poor in mineral and energetic resources, although self sufficient
for some basic goods, such as rice, Japan is not energetically self sufficient,
it strongly relies on nuclear power, and it imports most of the rough materials
which are transformed by its factories.
Japan
participates actively to some of the worst human actions of destruction of the
world ecosystem, which in the long term may result in critical worsening of the
living standards of human race. Nature maintains the power of sustaining,
damaging or even destroying social systems. Japan is an archipelago at the
junction of several oceanic and continental plates, and is subject to
earthquakes, typhoons and tsunami. It has what is probably the most advanced
and efficient prevention system against natural disasters, mainly thanks to
active social and popular participation, advanced technological level, long term
implementation of prevention politics and research, but it regularly suffers
human, economical and material losses because of its geological and
geo-meteorological characteristics.
Conclusion
The
conclusions that we can infer from the above are not particularly new to be
sincere. The first is the fact that social system are intrinsically vulnerable,
because of their nature, and at the same time they are potentially stable,
thanks to their inner great strength and complexity. They need a constant action
and work on many levels to limit their vulnerability: collective consciousness
and projections, mythologies, actions and organization of the system, power and
wealth distribution, social organization etc. Fractures are inevitable, but the
case of natural disaster shows that major harm to a system and to its people
can be prevented or alleviated. Fractures can strengthen the system, while the
non-solution of small problems, can generate greater ones and even
catastrophes. Finally, it is necessary to take conscience of the situation of
our societies in a global perspective. We have to become conscious of the fact
that we live in a community of planetary destinies, facing the global threats
which bring the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the triggering of
ethnic-religious conflicts, the degradation of the biosphere, the bivalent path
of an uncontrolled economy, the tyranny of money, the union of barbarisms
coming from the bottom of ages and the ice barbarism of technical and
economical calculations. The world system is condemned to death or to
transformation. Our age of changes has become the changing of age[40].
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