Albert W. Musschenga
Department of Philosophy
Vrije Universiteit
De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
aw.musschenga@dienst.vu.nl
Environmental ethicists will often say that in dealing with natural
entities we need the guidance of an ethic rooted in the intrinsic value of
nature. They will add that subjectivist value theories are unable to account
for the normativity of intrinsic value discourse. This preoccupation with
normativity explains why many environmental ethicists favour value objectivism.
As I see it, value theories must
address not only the problem of normativity but also the problem of motivation.
In fact, my approach to the question as to which type of value theory does most
justice to our intuition regarding the value of nature is primarily in terms of
the motivational perspective. I argue that neither the usual objectivist theories
nor their subjectivist counterparts can accommodate and explain the fact that
those who agree that nature has intrinsic value may well differ in motivation
to support its preservation. I suggest that such difference in kinds of
motivation is related to distinct kinds of value judgement in which belief in
the intrinsic value of nature is expressed.
To clarify my view I discuss the subjectivist value theory of Gerald Gaus.[1] Gaus regards the distinction between personal and impersonal value judgements to be deeply embedded in his theory. His internalism about the relation between reason and motivation however leads him to the mistaken conclusion that independent impersonal value judgements do not provide reasons for action. Next, I introduce the distinction between identity-neutral and identity-constitutive reasons. This distinction allows me to formulate more clearly the differences between the kinds of reasons provided by personal and impersonal value judgements.
The resulting theory explains how it
is that people who do not (personally) value nature
may still be motivated to support nature preservation. It also explains why not
everyone who endorses natural values will join movements for the preservation
of nature.
I.
In the summer of 1999 our family camped near Betws-y-Coed in North
Wales, not far from Snowdonia. The campsite offered us a magnificent view of
the surrounding hills and the valley leading to Penmachno. I could just see
myself living in this place. My wife and I had been there before, some nineteen
years earlier, and this second visit only confirmed for me why the first had
been so unforgettable. Many people have comparable experiences of being
overwhelmed by the greatness, the austerity or the peacefulness of a landscape
or a mountain range; or fascinated by the astonishing characteristics enabling
a species to survive; or impressed by the shape of a tree that has withstood
the centuries.
Not surprisingly, those
who care for nature (as environmentalists claim to do) want such natural entities
to be protected and preserved. If all humankind loved nature the preservation
of highly valued natural entities might be less of a problem. But not all
humankind does. Environmentalists know that they cannot attain their objectives
without the cooperation of others who may or may not be outspoken nature lovers
individual citizens, officials, civil servants, politicians, and so forth.
When these people do not join the effort spontaneously environmentalists seek
to convince them that they really should support the preservation cause. The
easiest way to do so would be to show that preservation of nature is in the
enlightened interest of all, and will be of benefit to future generations.
Obviously though, many natural entities are of no interest whatever to humans
and likely to remain so. Think of the thousands of plants and small animals
that disappeared, their extinction never affecting human interests. If
environmental ethics would justify their preservation, the appeal cannot be to
always contingent human interests. Accordingly, environmental philosophers
will claim that natural entities may have instrumental value, but that they may
have intrinsic value as well. Most ethical theories ascribe intrinsic value to
humans or human states of affairs only. The recognition that nature, too, may
be inscribed with intrinsic value implies the rejection of at least this kind
of anthropocentrism.
Understandably, for
many the notion of the intrinsic value of nature became the cornerstone of
non-anthropocentric theories of environmental ethics.[2]
Belief in the intrinsic value of nature (and natural entities) is now the very
credo of the environmentalist movement. The ascription of intrinsic value to
nature is expected to make a huge practical difference in nature-related
decision making. For one thing, according to John Baird Callicott, the burden
of proof is shifted from conservationists to those who, intentionally or
unintentionally, knowingly or inadvertently, destroy nature.[3]
Value theorists
mutually differ on the existence of intrinsic values; they differ even more
stridently on the ontological status of (intrinsic) values. Subjectivists hold
that nothing can have value independent of its being valued by humans.
Objectivists insist that values have an existence of their own, independent of
human valuation. Most environmentalists assume that the intrinsic value of
natural entities cannot be adequately defended in the context of a subjectivist
value theory.[4] To them, the
intrinsic value of nature is an objective datum. On their view objectivism is
the only acceptable value theory for environmental ethics.
Callicott is one of the
few environmental ethicists who defend a subjectivist value theory:
[w]e base our environmental ethics
on our human capacity to value non-human natural entities for what they are
irrespective both of what they may do for us and of whether or not they can
value themselves. And this we can do regardless of the nature of the object of
our intentional act of intrinsic valuation as long as we think we have good
reason to value it intrinsically.[5]
Callicott defends his view against the objection of anthropocentrism by
saying that from the fact that human consciousness is the source of
value, it by no means follows that the locus of all value is
consciousness itself or a mode of consciousness like reason, pleasure or
knowledge.[6] In spite of that, most environmentalists are
unhappy with Callicotts value subjectivism. Environmental philosopher Brian G.
Norton expresses their attitude: Callicott has denied the objectivity of
environmental values in any sense that would be helpful in environmental
policy, because environmental values are the subjective judgements of those
environmentalists.[7]
In Nortons view it is not the intrinsicality of the value of nature as such
that is at issue; the crux is whether we can connect intrinsicality to
objective values existing independent of human valuing. If the valuations of
nature lovers are the source of natures intrinsic value, how can that value be
binding also for people who do not spontaneously care about natures fate? What
is its normativity or authority?
The debate on the
authority of value judgements is but one of two central issues in contemporary
meta-ethics. The other is the problem of motivation. Environmentalists are
after more than just changing the dominant value judgements regarding nature.
They hold that a change in value judgement concerning nature is a condition for
change in behaviour towards nature, i.e. the altered judgement provides a
reason to act differently. This view is predicated on two assumptions: a) that
value judgements offer authoritative reasons for action, and b) that
authoritative reasons move to action. In environmental ethics, then, authority
and motivation are two crucial problems.
It is generally said
that subjectivist theories have more affinity with the problem of motivation
while objectivist theories are better able to account for the normativity of
value judgements. Where the one kind of theory is strong the other is weak. Objectivists have to
clarify the connection between the belief that nature has objective intrinsic
value and the motivation to actively preserve nature (or at least not to harm
it). Subjectivists have to explain how the ascription of intrinsic value by
some becomes normative and motivational for others.
In environmental ethics
the debate on the value of nature is biased towards the problem of normativity.
Critics usually reject value subjectivism because of its supposed inadequacy vis-à-vis
normativity. But this leads them to overlook its strengths with respect to the
problem of motivation. Robin Attfield, for example, holds that subjectivist
theories cannot accommodate the normativity of intrinsic value discourse.
Although he concedes that subjectivist interpretations of intrinsic value are
possible he considers them difficult to defend:
If having value meant being valued, then subjectivism would be irresistible, and having intrinsic value might simply mean being valued (by someone or other) as an end for itself. But if valuable means bearing reasons for being desired, fostered, or cherished it is implausible that this is valuable is equivalent to this is valued by or [valued] by Xs (as subjectivists used to suggest), or even with the Y valuational framework. The valuers concerned might well actually have their reasons but, given this sense of valuable, the mere act of valuing on their part, however reasonable, would be insufficient to make the objects of valuation valuable.[8]
Note that Callicotts preference for a subjectivist theory is not based
on such theorys strength in the matter of motivation. Rather, his partiality
stems from doubts about the plausibility of the ontology underlying value
objectivism. Both Callicott and Attfield focus on ontological issues;
consequently, the position taken determines the range of solutions available to
them regarding the problem of motivation.
Unlike most of the
literature, the present paper considers the question of what type of value
theory accords best with our intuition regarding the value of nature from the
motivation perspective. Curiously, value-objectivist environmental ethicists
abstract from the very thing that explains their commitment and motivation,
namely their own valuations. Worth noting also is that some nature-preservation
supporters explain their action by telling us what nature means to them, while
others use more detached, impersonal arguments. This suggests that for the
first group personal valuings are the basic elements in their talk about the
value of nature, while the second group starts from less personal cognitive
judgements.
It seems to me that to
be adequate a value theory should meet at least two conditions. First, it
should recognise and explain the importance of valuings. Secondly, it should
recognise and explain the fact that among those who endorse the value of a
certain entity some will in fact value that entity, while others will not. Why
insist that the importance of valuings be recognised and explained? Well,
humans (and possibly other species, but this is not relevant here) do value.
Humans respond to the world around them through valuings. Valuings have an
epistemic and a motivational meaning. They tell us something about both the
valuers and the objects they value. They also explain why people go after
something. Valuings can be said to be basic from a phenomenological point of
view.
The second condition
for the adequacy of a value theory: explain why endorsing the value of an
entity does not imply valuing that entity. On this point neither the standard
objectivist theories nor the standard subjectivist ones are adequate.
Objectivist theories concentrate on what should be valued, not on what is
factually valued. Apparently, they assume that we should value every valuable
thing. But this is unreasonable. There are a lot of things we consider
valuable, i.e. worthwhile, that we dont value. Subjectivists are not able to
meet my second condition either. They want to explain how we come to believe
that what we actually value is or is not worthy of being valued. They seem to
assume that valuing necessarily precedes evaluation. But this conflicts with my
observation that people sometimes do act upon value judgements that are not
based on (personal) valuings.
Consequently, both objectivist and subjectivist theories aiming to accommodate
the observation that humans act upon two kinds of value judgement a personal
and a more impersonal kind will be faced with limits inherent to their
respective type of theory. We need a transformation towards a theory that goes
beyond the usual opposition between objectivism and subjectivism.
To prove exhaustively
that my account is correct would demand more space than available here. Hence I
will restrict myself to analysing one specific value theory: Gerald Gauss
cognitive-affective theory.[9]
I have two reasons to do so. First, the theory is subjectivist, and has a
certain advantage in dealing with the problem of motivation (and is unpopular
among environmental ethicists). Secondly, Gaus shows some affinity with my
observations mentioned above , i.e. that valuings are important and that among those who
endorse the value of a certain entity some will in fact value that entity,
while others will not. To see just where the theory runs into its limits
we need some acquaintance with its conceptual framework, basic tenets and
presuppositions.
As can be expected in a subjectivist value theory, Gauss basic concept
is valuing. Valuings are prior to value judgements. Gaus defines them
as dispositional emotions towards objects, providing reasons for action.
Valuings are not simply desires; they may well be desires not to desire.[10]
Valuings are based on beliefs about their objects. My valuing
Ruitersvlei Cabernet Sauvignon 1997, a South African red wine, gives me a
reason to buy it. Gaus makes a further distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic valuings. An object valued for its own sake is said to have intrinsic
value. Gaus, then, has no problem with recognising that nature can have
intrinsic value. An object is valued extrinsically or instrumentally if it is
valued for the sake of another valued object.[11]
The source of an instrumentally valued object is always extrinsic. Its value is
derivative. All extrinsic values are based on intrinsic valuings. Intrinsic
valuings are foundational, that is, they are not based on or grounded in any
other valuing.[12] Values, or a persons values, are
either important abstract valuings or patterns of valuings.[13]
Value judgements
have to do with the appropriateness of valuings, i.e. they answer the question
whether objects of valuings are indeed worthy of being valued. Value judgements
can either ground certain valuings or prove that the beliefs on which they are
based are incorrect. These beliefs are related to socio-cultural, impersonal
standards. My beliefs about Ruitersvlei Cabernet Sauvignon 1997 are based on
certain ideas about wines acquired during my education and socialisation within
a particular socio-cultural environment. If the 1997 vintage yielded a wine as
good as I thought it would, the reason I believed I had for buying it is
justified. I then have not only a motivating reason but also a justifying
reason to buy that wine. If the belief is not justified it will be rational for
me to stop valuing it.
According to Gaus value judgements
influence action by (re)directing
valuings. He distinguishes personal and impersonal value judgements. A personal
value judgement asserts that X is valuable based on i) apprehending X in
the relevant affective mode and ii) a conviction or at least an assumption that
this emotional response is appropriate. The object of a personal value
judgement is the relation between the valuing and that which is valued. Suppose
I value a painting because I think it is a Van Gogh. If I discover that Van
Gogh was not the artist, the value judgement will say that it is not worthy of
being valued, at least that my valuing was inappropriate.
Impersonal value
judgements do not rest on a personal experience of an emotion, that is,
they do not presuppose my valuing. Image that John, a student of Russian
literature, is a great admirer of Dostoyevskis work, but not particularly fond
of poetry. Suppose he has a friend whose favourite poet is the Russian poet
Osip Mandelstam. He asks John who doesnt know
Mandelstams work, to read one of his poems. John says that it is a very
good poem. But he clearly does not apprehend the poem in the relevant mode. His
value judgement is an impersonal one. He refers to what Gaus calls relevant
impersonal criteria, which may be the criteria of popular opinion, experts or
authorities.[14] The object of an impersonal value judgement
is the relation between a thing and the values and standards in the community.
Introduction of a
category of impersonal value judgements that do not presuppose valuings is an
interesting move within a subjectivist theory. Gaus meets my requirement that
an adequate value theory should allow for value judgements that are not
connected to valuings. My point was that the existence of such judgements is an
observed fact. Within a subjectivist theory however the question arises whether
such judgements have motivational force: are they able to influence action?
Regarding impersonal
value judgements Gaus says to be an externalist. Externalists contend that a
rational agent can accept a value judgement while denying that it has necessary
implications for his action. A person can be perfectly competent at evaluating
something as good on the relevant standard without having any use for such
goodness, the purpose it serves, or pro-attitude toward it.[15]
Gaus allows though that at least some impersonal value judgements do provide
one with reasons for action. They do have motivational force, be it much weaker
than in the case of personal value judgements. How does he explain this
motivational force, weak as it may be?
Whatever is judged to
be worthy of being valued may well actually become valued at some future time.
Such impersonal value judgements give us external reasons which provide us with
prima facie personal reasons to at least get acquainted with what is judged to
be valuable.[16] The motivating belief is about prospective
affects.[17]
The
urge to act upon an impersonal value judgement may differ in strength. Gaus
gives the example of an environmentalist who has formed an impersonal value
judgement about a certain wilderness area that, since he has never been there,
is largely unfamiliar to him. The judgement may motivate him to join the effort
to preserve that area.[18]
Gaus regards the distinction between
personal and impersonal value judgements to be deeply embedded in his theory.
That is why I will examine his view on impersonal value judgements more
closely. Suppose a man, Oliver, who greatly admires his aged grandfather. The
elderly gentleman tells him that of the reading throughout his life he values
John Donnes poems most of all. In preparation of a long weekend Oliver borrows
a collection of Donnes poems. His wife asks him why this selection. He answers
that according to his grandfather Donnes poetry is among the very best, and
that he might come to value the poems. Let us assume that during much of the
weekend he makes a genuine effort to understand them and to find value in them,
but ultimately concludes that for him they have none, that he is unable to
value them. For Gaus, Olivers discovery that he cannot value Donnes poems and
hence has no reason to read them, need not imply that he also has to stop
believing that from an impersonal point of view the poems do have value. I
interpret Gaus as saying that Oliver might still find that there is reason to
read Donnes poems that they are worth reading. But this is no longer a
reason to read them -- for Oliver.
I can understand that
the discovery that one cannot value X does not force one to conclude that X is
not worthy of being valued. Olivers acquaintance with Donnes poems could of
course have led to that conclusion. In that case, since Donne is a widely
acclaimed poet, Oliver would have to show that current opinions on Donne are
wrong. In any case, Gauss belief that the
original impersonal value judgement about X need not be affected even if one,
after exploring X, comes to the conclusion that one does not value X, is highly
implausible
Because Oliver was unfamiliar with
Donnes work, his decision to read his poetry must have been based on trust in
his grandfathers judgement. There is nothing wrong with that. We often act
upon reasons advanced by others whose judgement we trust. I call these
reasons dependent reasons. But these dependent reasons become
superfluous once we ourselves have acquired the relevant experience and insight
and are able to say whether or not we value a thing and find it worthy to be
valued.
As Oliver reads and
seeks to understand Donnes poems he forms his own opinion about them. Either
he agrees with his grandfathers judgement or he does not. If he does value the
poems and finds them worthy of being valued, his original dependent impersonal judgement has become an (independent) personal one. But what
if Oliver does find them worthy of being valued though he personally does not
value them? Can he be said to retain his original (dependent)
value judgement? That is, as we have seen, Gauss view. Obviously not. He
either affirms his grandfathers judgement or he rejects it. If he affirms the
judgement he personally endorses the standards on which it is based. In
that case the original dependent impersonal value judgement develops into an independent
one. Independent impersonal value judgements presuppose that one has some
personal knowledge of and experience with the object of the judgement.
A further clarification is needed here. Did
not Oliver already endorse the standards when the judgement was still a
dependent one? In daily life we accept the standards of the community we live
in, as long as we have no reason to doubt them. Experts in art are very
positive about the abstract paintings of Mondriaan from the later period of
his life. I know too little about art in general and Mondriaans work in
particular to have reason to question their judgement. This does not mean that
for me a dependent impersonal judgement is merely a quoted judgement, a mere
reiteration of a belief widely accepted in a group and not necessarily
expressing my attitude towards the object of the judgement and the standards on
which the judgement is based. I accept both the standards and their
judgement. Only a lengthy study of art and personal knowledge of Mondriaans
artistic views and works could bring me to endorse the standards and the
judgements.
In Gauss view Olivers
impersonal value judgement about Donnes poetry no longer provides him with any
reason for action once he has come to the insight that he is unable to value
it.[19]
The consequence of this is that if a museum containing a rare collection of
first prints of Donnes poems were to catch fire, Oliver would see no reason to
save that collection. Transposed to my terminology, this would mean that only
dependent impersonal value judgements provide reasons for action and merely
because of the link with future valuings at that. But I think it is
counter-intuitive to hold that independent impersonal value judgements do not
provide reasons for action.
What reasons are provided by independent impersonal value judgements? To answer
this question we must move beyond the limits of Gauss theory.
The distinction Gaus makes between personal and impersonal value
judgements is supported by the phenomenology of moral experience. Certainly,
some of my value judgements are personal. They are preceded or accompanied by
valuings. They are not only cognitive but also emphatically affective. Others
are impersonal and less affective, as they are not accompanied by valuings.
Gauss argument for his assertion that a (dependent) impersonal value judgement
has less motivational force than a personal one is that there are more things
worthy of being valued that I can possible value. When deliberating about
action, my focus must be on things that I actually value whose value I
appreciate and not on the innumerable things that are worthy of being valued
but are not actually valued by me.[20] This is an important insight that merits
closer examination.
My favourite example of
something I regard as worthy of being valued, though I do not value it, is
sports. I have neither talents nor ambitions in that area. Although I do not
value sports personally, I do think sports
have intrinsic value. Mindful of my limited talents and capacities and
especially the fact that there are many more values and goals than I can strive
for in the course of my life, I must decide to further some values and projects
rather than others. This requires some soul searching on my part: which kind of
values and projects are dear to me and within the scope of my talents and
opportunities. Though I may recognise much as intrinsically good, not all of
that can be equally important to me. It is humanly impossible to have a special
relationship with all the values I am prepared to recognise. My valuings play
an important role in the deliberation as to which values and projects should be
central to my life. The values and projects to which I ultimately decide to
dedicate my life constitute the core of my identity. They are distinctive of my
identity.
Personal and impersonal value
judgements provide different kinds of reasons. Let us designate reasons
provided by personal value judgements as identity-constitutive reasons, and
reasons provided by impersonal independent value judgements as identity-neutral
reasons. Unlike identity-neutral reasons, identity-constitutive reasons refer
not only to the intrinsic merit of an agents options, but also to the
significance or meaning of an option in terms of the agents life plan or life
story.
Let me explain more
fully what I mean by identity-constitutive reasons. A common distinction is
that between subjective and objective reasons. Subjective reasons refer to a
persons interests. I can justify my buying a certain type of automobile by
referring to subjective reasons. But if a couple would justify its decision to
have an abortion, people will not accept merely subjective reasons. In public
justification one expects objective reasons, i.e. reasons based on shared
values and principles. An objective
reason is a reason for someones action only if it refers to values, principle,
projects or relationships that he recognises as valuable, as worthwhile. We noted that only recognised values provide an
agent with reasons for action. This means that all objective reasons
that are reasons for someone to act, are in a sense related to his values,
projects, and so on. That is to say, both identity-constitutive and
identity-neutral reasons refer to shared values endorsed by the agent. Both
types of reasons are his reasons for action; both are part of his
identity, but only the identity-constitutive reasons mark him as the special
person that he is.[21]
What sort of reasons do
impersonal value judgements provide? Let us turn to Gaus once again. Why is he
led to deny that independent impersonal value judgements provide one with
reasons for action? Gaus argues that impersonal value judgements point at an
object or state of affairs that might be interesting to explore since it is
deemed worthwhile (by relevant experts) in the community. Suppose that the
environmentalist in Gauss example acts upon the reason implied in his still
dependent impersonal value judgement about the wilderness area and decides to
visit it. His visit teaches him that
that wilderness area does not evoke in him a dispositional emotion. In Gauss
view it no longer provides him with a reason to act. He can retain his original
impersonal value judgement, but he has no more use for it. The judgement no
longer contains a motivating belief about prospective affects.
I can imagine that the environmentalist still finds the wilderness area
worthy of being valued, though he does not value it himself. I disagree that
there is no further use for that independent impersonal value judgement. My
impersonal value judgement concerning sports certainly does make a difference
when I am called upon to choose between supporting a political party that wants
to terminate state subsidy for sports and one that does not. It commits me to
vote for the latter. To be sure, my motivation to side with that party does not
stem from anticipated personal affects. But what more do I need to explain and
justify my action, other than my belief in the intrinsic value of sports? The
reason provided by an independent impersonal value judgement differs both in
content and in motivational strength from a reason predicated on a personal
value judgement. Suppose I was called upon to decide between laying out a new
golf course and the creation of a wetland area. I would certainly prefer the
second option because my judgement about the intrinsic value of wetlands is a
personal one.
Gauss distinction
between, on the one hand, valuings and personal value judgements, and, on the
other hand, impersonal value judgements is an important step towards a value
theory that incorporates both objective and subjective elements. However, his
particular view on the relation between reasons for action and motivation
impedes him to explain why independent impersonal value that are not
accompanied by valuings, still can provide reasons for action. My example of
sports shows that there can still be use for such judgements. Gaus cannot
recognise such a use because it is not connected with a motivating belief
about prospective affects. He cannot recognise the reason for action that I
regard to be implied in my independent impersonal value judgement regarding
sport as a good reason for action because the connection with a motivating
belief about prospective affects functions as a motivational constraint on what
can count as good reasons for action.
In the view of Jonathan Dancy the
use of a motivational constraint is a
mark of an internalist view about the relation between good reasons and
motivation. However, as we have seen, Gaus regards himself in his account of
impersonal value judgements to be an externalist with respect to reasons, while
being an internalist in his account of personal value judgements. I contend
that he is an internalist in both accounts. The only reason why he thinks that
his account of impersonal value judgements is externalist, is that reasons for
action implied by such judgements are not concerned with promoting what one
presently values. However, he does stress that [a]n account of the action
implications of impersonal judgments will center on their relation with actual
valuings.[22] The
environmentalist in his example already has more general and abstract valuings
about nature. That is why he can have a motivating belief about prospective
affects. According to Dancys definition this is an internalist view:
Internalism
amounts to a
motivational constraint on good reasons; something can only be a good reason
for me if it is related to what I would want if I deliberated rationally and
knew the relevant facts, starting from where I am now.[23]
Although the environmentalist does not need to presently value the
wilderness area, there need to be a relation between his possible future
valuing of it and some of his actual more general, abstract valuings. It is
this motivational constraint that causes Gaus to deny that the reasons implied
in my impersonal value judgements concerning sports are good reasons for me to
act, not the absence of a use. I cannot go into the debate on what is the
best theory about the relation between reasons and motivation. It should be
clear that an internalist view cannot accommodate my observation that recognising the intrinsic value of nature as such
motivate some form of support of preserving nature. Dancys pure cognitivist
view is, I think, a good candidate for a more adequate view.[24]
My rejection of Gauss
internalism does not affect the elements that make his theory attractive. I
recall Gauss remark that personal value judgements may have stronger
motivational force than impersonal ones. Here I am in agreement with Gaus.
However, while he only thinks of what I called dependent impersonal value
judgements, in my view this also applies to independent impersonal value
judgements. A person who not only thinks that nature has intrinsic value is
intrinsically valuable but also values nature, has an identity-constitutive
reason to work for its preservation. His value judgements concerning nature are
personal and not impersonal judgements. This person cannot however be expected
to put the same effort into other values to help the homeless, for instance.
He may recognise the values behind helping the homeless as genuine. He can
endorse them even when he has not identified with them, when he does not
dedicate his life to realising them. Although his value judgements with respect
to helping the homeless are impersonal, these values do provide him with a
reason for some actions, such as donating money to organisations that work for
the homeless.
In the first section of this paper I announced that I would approach the
question as to what type of value theory does most justice to our intuitions
regarding the value of nature primarily from the perspective of the problem of
motivation. I said that the usual objectivist and subjectivist theories do not
accommodate and explain the fact that those who underwrite the judgement that
nature has intrinsic value may have different kinds of motivation to support
the preservation of nature. I suggested that this difference may be related to
a difference in kinds of value judgements expressing the belief that nature has
intrinsic value. I discussed Gauss subjectivist value theory critically and in
doing so was able to clarify my own views. Gaus regards the distinction between
personal and impersonal value judgements to be central to his theory; his
motivational externalism however forces him to the wrong conclusion that
independent impersonal value judgements cannot provide motivational reasons for
action. The distinction between identity-neutral and identity-constitutive
reasons made it possible to formulate more clearly the difference between the
kinds of reasons provided by personal and impersonal value judgements.
This view on the
different ways in which people can be motivated to contribute to undertakings
such as nature preservation seems more promising than the usual views on
motivation in subjectivist and objectivist value theories. My choice to develop
the account from within the framework of a subjectivist theory was also meant
to show the importance of certain insights contained in that kind of theory, in particular those pertaining to valuing.
Recognising the importance of valuing however is one thing, making it into a
foundational element of a value theory, as subjectivists tend to do, is
another. One need not be an ontological subjectivist to do justice to the
subjectivity of valuing. The insight of the
importance of valuings is not accessible from within subjectivist
theories alone.
There is a strong tradition in objectivist theory, too, that looks upon
emotional experience as a source or warrant for beliefs about values.[25]
Early in this paper I
expressed the view that to be adequate a value theory should give satisfactory
answers to the problem both of normativity and of motivation. I explained my
decision to concentrate on the motivation problem by referring to the fact
that, especially in environmental ethics, the problem of normativity dominates
the debate on value theory. How do my views on value theory relate to the
problem of normativity? I said that identity-constitutive and identity-neutral
reasons all refer to shared values, endorsed by an agent. Shared values are
inter-subjective; this is the only form of objectivity acceptable in
subjectivist theories. Now, I did not intend to claim, much less seek to prove,
that subjectivist theories are satisfactory in all respects. Some authors think
that a new reading of Humean moral theory may provide foundations for
environmentalism[26], others
conclude that addressing the problem of normativity requires stronger forms of
objectivity.[27]
In closing I return to
the debate within environmental ethics. My theory seems to do justice to the
complex phenomenology of our moral intuitions regarding nature, and to the
complex fabric of our valuings and value judgements regarding natural entities.
The theory explains how people who do not value nature may nevertheless be
motivated to support nature preservation. It also explains why not everyone who
endorses environmental values will actively join movements for nature
preservation. Humans differ in sensitivity to the values of nature.
[2] Examples of influential attempts to justify the
intrinsic value of nature are: Tom Regan, (1983) The Case for Animal Rights.
Berkeley, California: University of California Press and Paul W. Taylor (1986) Respect
for Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press. Brian G. Norton argues that environmental ethics cannot be
founded on a notion of intrinsic value ((1987) Why Preserve Natural Variety?
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press).
[3] Callicott,
John Baird (1995) Intrinsic Values in Nature: a Metaethical Analysis, The
Electronic Journal of Analytical Philosophy 3, [19].
[4] Here I agree with John ONeill ((1992). The
Varieties of Intrinsic Value. The Monist 75, p. 208-227.)
[5] Callicott (1995), [67]
[6] Callicott,
John Baird (1999) Beyond the Land Ethic. Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
p. 133
[7] Norton, Brian G. (1992) Epistemology and
Environmental Values, The Monist 75, p. 221. Norton is not himself a
classical, ontological objectivist. As pragmatist he defends a relational
conception of objectivity that denies the independence of values from facts (see
Norton, Brian G. 1995. Objectivity,
Intrinsicality and Sustainability: Comments on Nelsons Health and Disease as
Thick Concepts in Ecosystemic Contexts, Environmental Values 4, p.
323-332).
[8] Attfield, Robin (2001) Postmodernism, Value and Objectivity,
Environmental Values 10, p. 15.
[9] Gaus, o.c.
[10] Elisabeth
Anderson, whose value theory is similar to that of Gaus, illustrates: someone
who tries to stop smoking does not value smoking though he actually desires to
smoke. He wants to be a non-smoking person (Anderson, Elisabeth. (1993) Value
in Ethics and Economics. Cambridge, Mass./London: Harvard University
Press.)
[11] O.c., p. 130.
[12] O.c., p. 140.
[13] O.c., p. 10.
[14] O.c., p.158,9.
[15] O.c., p. 155.
[16] O.c., section 10.3.
[17] O.c., p. 165. Gaus does
not argue that the belief that one will come to see the value of something in
the future necessarily provides one with a reason to pursue it. All that is
implied by accepting that impersonal value judgements can be motivating is that
the belief that ones present self the self as one conceives it would grasp
the value providing ones present self with reasons to pursue it (O.c.,
p. 203, note 132). He rejects temporal neutrality.
[18] O.c., p. 163.
[19] O.c. p. 190.
[20] O.c., p. 163.
[21] I elaborate the distinction between (the role of) identity-constitutive
and identity-neutral reasons in more detail in my Narrative Justification and
Identity-Constitutive Reasons (in Maureen Sie, Marc Slors and Bert van den
Brink (eds.), Reasons of Ones Own. Aldershot etc.: Ashgate
(forthcoming)) .
[22] O.c., p. 164.
[23] Dancy, Jonathan (2000) Practical Reality.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 16.
[24] Pure
cognitivism
supposes that a complete motivating state can consist of nothing
but cognitive states. It allows that, where there is motivation, there will be
desire. But it understands the desire as the state of being motivated rather
than as some part of what motivates (Dancy, o.c., p. 85)
[25] Lemos, Noam (1994) Intrinsic Value. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, p. 180,1.
[26] See e.g. Alan Carter (2000) Humean Nature Environmental Values,
9, pp. 3-37.
[27] Some authors argue that moral experience supports an
ontological value objectivism. We value a thing to discover that we are under
the sway of its valence, says Holmes Rolston III in an article about the
subjectivity/objectivity of values in nature ((1982) Are Values in Nature
Subjective or Objective? Environmental Ethics , 4, p.143). He holds
that a theory in which values are represented as projections on a neutral world is not able to explain
this experience. A similar position is taken by Charles Taylor. He says that
there is a demand on us to respect the integrity of the wilderness areas, for
example, which goes beyond the call of long-term prudence. This demand is something
that we discover. That is why he cannot but think of himself as a moral realist
((1991) Comments and Reply Inquiry, 4, p. 246). The central question
regarding objectivists theories is how to conceive objectivity. Many authors
defend a secondary quality-like objectivity of values. See a.o. John McDowell
((1985) Values and Secondary Qualities, in Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality
and Objectivity. London etc.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.110-130) and
Colin McGinn ((1983) The Subjective View. Oxford: Clarendon.).