Anton van
Harskamp
I
believe our largest problems have grown from the earths remotest corners as
well as our own backyards, and that salvation may lie in those places, too.
Barbara
Kingsolver
This text is an essay
in social theory. It is a tentative way of finding an answer to two questions:
exactly what kind of distinction is the one between religion and local context,
and how can we use it in a fruitful way in social research?
The general line of argument runs
as follows. In the first section it will be suggested that although the
distinction is common in social research, researchers tend to colour it by a (missionary)
theology of a Western kind (1). The second section will discuss the main ways in
which the notion of context can be used, whereupon the line of argumentation
proceeds to a sketch of some models which shape the theologically informed view
of the (local) context-bound character of all religion. Here we already get the
impression that this view presupposes an essentialized sui
generis religion (2). This will be elaborated on in the third section. The
reader will find the first indications for an underlying basic paradox, a
paradox which probably renders the theologically informed distinction
inappropriate for social research: just because context is always present,
researchers are inclined to look for a mysterious essence which is considered to
be released from context. This mysterious essence, which is considered to be a
fully unique and separate aspect of human beings, can by definition not be
investigated (3). The fourth and last section is a necessary addition to the
general line of argumentation: since we may presume that the theologically
informed distinction is not appropriate for social research, the question arises
in what way we can do justice to localized religion in social research. In this
last section it will be suggested that wed better replace the notion of
context by the notion of local practices (4).
The term
context and the several concepts in which this term is incorporated, such
as contextualism, contexture and contextual analysis, are very often used in
social sciences. From the political sciences to ethnomethodology and discourse
analysis the notion is even essential for the character and methodology of
various disciplines (Goodwin/Duranti 1992). In an important way, this is also
the case for cultural anthropology. It would even be legitimate to state that
ever since cultural anthropology established itself as a social-scientific
discipline, anthropological investigation became a form of contextual analysis.
This is because any particular part of a culture had to be understood in its
context, which almost automatically meant: in its local context. Practical and
ethnographical reasons made a clearly restricted geographical and social area of
investigation an obvious choice (Tanner 1997: 34f.). So, the dominant discourse
on local context does have a social-scientific nature.
However, the discourse in which the relation between local
context on the one hand and religion in particular on the other hand is
discussed nowadays, is, so we may presume, often and predominantly shaped, or
heavily influenced, by (missionary) theology
and religious studies (as far as these are executed in the classical tradition
of phenomenology in line of the German Religionswissenschaften).
That is to say, as far as Christian forms of religion are concerned, and as far
as were referring to those Christian communities in the Southern hemisphere
which were once co-founded by Christian missionary organizations. It is highly
probable that this is due to the development of the self-understanding of these
communities. This self-understanding probably influences the social-scientific
view of the matter. Lets be somewhat
more specific.
Although the departure of colonial patterns in these
communities was usually prepared long before the nineteen-seventies, sometimes
even already finished during that time, for instance in the form of Independent
Churches, it was not until this decade that the
ultimate model was delivered with which Latin-American, African and Asian
religious communities apparently could break away from religious patterns of
colonialism. This model was the contextual view on church and religion. In the
background of the rising popularity of this model we can observe several needs:
the need of local churches for their own identities, the need for inculturation
of the Christian gospel in the local culture and their the need for liberation
from cultural and political pressures (beset as they are by old colonial
patterns and all kind of actual economical and political pressures). These needs
were a consequence of at least two ideas. In the first place that European and
Anglo-American values and patterns were demeaning their own dignity and culture,
while their own values and patterns were as good, if not better, than those
internalized values and patterns of their former colonizers. If,
to give just one example, African and Asian religious communities recognize that
healing practices are quite normal in the biblical world and
in their own culture, while in the Western world, this is the domain of the
medical profession, then this recognition has a liberating effect. In the second
place, there was the idea that those strange values and patterns i.e.
the strict separation between religion and health - were actually interposing
between their own local community and the gospel message. So we can
understand that the contextual view on religion, in particular the presupposed
distinction between religion and local context, formed an important way to meet
the above-mentioned needs (Schreiter 1992; Bevans 1992: 6f., 20; Nyamiti 1992).
However beware of the paradox! The contextual view (distinguishing between local context and religion) was developed and introduced with the help of a Western-European and Anglo-American point of view, a view that was usually theologically informed! (cf. Van Harskamp 2000: 11-15). In this essay I shall suggest that, if local religious communities (and theological and social-scientific observers of the dynamics in which these communities are involved) are clinging to the usual, i.e. theologically informed view on the relation between context and religion, theyre running the risk of being unknowingly heirs of a hidden legacy of an imperialist logic! (cf. Murphy 1994; McCutcheon 1997: 128, 164). This of course will be all the more paradoxical when it happens in an anti-colonial vein.
2. A theologically informed distinction
2.1. The general notion of context
We may say
that the notion involves juxtaposing two things: on the one hand there is a
focal event, action, discourse or whatever social and cultural phenomenon is at
stake and on the other hand the surrounding field, i.e. the context (Tracy 1998:
3). We may also state that the focal phenomenon and the surrounding field are
functionally related to each other (Owen 1997). Moreover, we may draw a
distinction between two kinds of functional relationships or, to use other terms,
between two kinds of application of the notion of context (cf. Van den Eeden
1994: 57f.). The first kind has
to do with the way in which we approach a phenomenon. In this way we could think
of it in a more trivial, say cliché-ridden way. For instance, when we bring up
the opinion that we cannot understand anything, an utterance or any other
particular thing, out of its context. Everyone knows that in that case all
understanding fails. One can also speak in a more sophisticated way, for
instance when we reckon with the disciplinary perspective from which one
looks at a particular phenomenon, lets say whenever one wishes to
investigate a group of individuals as a biologist, or as a social-psychologist,
or as a political theorist or as a philosopher. Of course, the perspectives can
be refined further and further, also within one discipline. There may be indeed
an almost endless differentiation within a discipline, a differentiation which
in practice stimulates the never ending debates between the proponents of
a certain methodological perspective or worldview (for it is plausible to assume
that a lot of debates and conflicts in the social sciences have to do with
incommensurabilities concerning the context as perspective, worldview,
blik etc.: Van Harskamp 1996). Now, lets for the sake of clarity, call
all these uses of the notion of context epistemological
applications. The second kind of
use of the notion will then be, of course, ontological
applications. We have to think of all sorts of functional relations between
a focal phenomenon and its surrounding field, which establishes a range of real
connections, stretching from looser to more tightly structured connections. A
looser connection between focal phenomenon and context can, for instance, be
formed by the critical, legitimating or affirming functions, which a local
religious community can execute for the surrounding political society. A tighter
connection will be at stake whenever we assume that a specific context, lets
say a social class structure or a certain economic infrastructure, functions as
a condition which determines the dynamics in which a religious community is
involved. One can even describe a situation in which the very existence of a
religious community is dependent on the condition of the internal dynamics of a
certain context. However, even when there is an almost full and real connection
between the existence of the conditioning context and the existence of a
religious community, - so even when
we may say that context and religion cannot exist without each other - the
theological way of thinking nevertheless seduces us to presuppose an essential
distinction between religion and context.
2.2. A sui generis religion
In order to
understand why this is the case, well have to pay some more attention to the theological view on context and religion.
From the very beginning of modern contextual theology,
this theology appears to wrestle with two fundamental problems. The first
problem is how to combine two religious convictions. On the one hand there is
the conviction that the Gospel has a universal bearing and that the Christian
tradition provides universal doctrines and guidelines for behaviour. This
conviction implies that the Christian faith, sc. the human answer to the Gospel
and the tradition, is supposed to be quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab
omnibus creditum est (what has been believed everywhere, always, and by
everybody; a statement from Vincent of Lerins, a learned peregrine monk who
lived in the fifth century). On the other hand there is the conviction that just
as the divine Creator, ultimate symbol for universality, once incarnated Himself
into a finite human being who spoke, acted and had a will, in other words, who
was living according to the cultural models and repertoires of a particular
cultural context, the universality of the Christian message has in an analogous
way to be applied, interpreted, even shaped in every local, cultural context (Tennekes
1989).
The second problem arises from the first one. In
simple terms, this problem comes down to the question how far or how
much a local cultural context may express itself in restricted local
practices, idioms, ideals, in short, in particular circumstances shaped by
people on the spot. One can understand why theologians and other Christian
believers who are dealing with context and Christian religion, in the end always
find themselves confronted with the question of criteria for specific Christian
identity: they need criteria in order to distinguish between too much and
too little context (Schillebeeckx 1982, Schreiter 1985: 99, 117-121; Vroom
1989; Bevans 1992: 17-20; Grenz/Franke 2001: 159ff.). For too much context
means that the text whether we call it faith, tradition, Scripture,
worship or whatever is swallowed up by the context (Frieling 1995: 74). If
for instance we wish to investigate the habits and routines of a local religious
community strictly from a contextual perspective, one might be inclined to
search for more and more different contextual conditions in the surrounding
field, in order to explain the structure and the existence of these habits and
routines. This search for contexts however, can easily become such an enterprise
that the objects of investigation itself, the above-mentioned habits and
routines, paradoxically disappear into singularity. This is because the
conspicuous effect of the ongoing search for the contextual surroundings of a
particular phenomenon is a growing degree of singularity of that phenomenon. In
the end we will come to the point in which we cannot even say if there is
something at the focal phenomenon which can be compared with other religious
phenomena, because the aspects of the object which could make them
comparable with other objects have disappeared: comparison becomes
impossible. For comparison always needs difference and a certain degree of
sameness (Scharfstein 1989: passim). So, the overall effect of too much
context is that the text will disappear into context; while too
little context will make the Christian religion too abstract, too ideal
to make contact with real, i.e. localized life.
It is particularly due to this second problem that most contextual theologians are inclined to make a pretty sharp distinction between religion and context, in order to steer the middle way between too much and too little context.
Of course there are several models in which
theologians (and classical phenomenological scholars) conceptualize this
distinction (cf. Bevans 1992: 30-110). The most widespread model is the
so-called translation model. It is based on the sharp epistemological and
ontological distinction between supra-local, supra-cultural and constant
meanings of the divine message on the one hand and the always local, cultural
and changing forms in which this message is expressed (translated) on the other
hand (cf. Kraft 1979: 118ff.). This model actually presupposes the distinction
between absolute kernel and the purely relative, nonessential husk. It will be
clear that the husk, i.e. the local cultural context as a form, does not have
any importance for its own sake, but only for the sake of that which it conveys
(cf. Kraft 1979: 99). As a relative, materialized, always changing form it is
always considered to be ephemeral, which in line with this way of thinking
renders it not really important.
There are also more sophisticated models, for instance
those in which the essential role of the local cultural context is acknowledged
as a highly important and ineradicable source of the manifestation of all
religion, just as valuable as other sources like Scripture and Tradition.
Generally, these models presuppose an insightful feeling for the context-bound
character of all religion, including Western ways of theological and religious
thinking. However, the central argument in this essay will be the idea that the
very use of the distinction between religion and context almost inevitably leads
to unsolvable problems, even when one makes use of a more sophisticated model
than the translation model. Lets have a look at an example of the Catholic
theologian Robert J. Schreiter. He developed a refined, synthetic model for
contextual local theology. In one of his texts, he signals a dialectical
relationship between religion and local, cultural context. He then suggests that
in the dialectical dynamics between the divine message and a local cultural
context,
the presentation of the gospel is gradually
disengaged from its previous cultural embeddedness and is allowed to take on new
forms consonant with the new cultural setting (Schreiter 1994: 25; also cited
by Grenz/Franke 2001: 155).
This way of
speaking about message and forms, however, in the end betrays the distinction
again between (disengaged) kernel and husk, although not in an ontological but
in an epistemological way.
This distinction, in itself not unproblematic, is not
innocent for other reasons as well. For the distinction entails a penchant for a
particular, i.e. a Western view on the so-called kernel of religion. We can
detect this penchant where Schreiter in his main work on local theologies deals
with the question how we have to consider the inculturation of the Christian
tradition into a local context (Schreiter 1985: 113-117). He proposes an analogy
with Noam Chomskys model for language acquisition. Schreiters argument
comes down to the suggestion that the positive Christian tradition can be
understood as the entire language system, while the forms, habits and practices
in the local religious community can be seen as analogous to language
performances. And what may be the Christian faith then, the personal act of
believing? Schreiter suggests that we may consider personal faith being
something like language competence. We have to bear in mind the presupposed
essence of religion. This essence is basically a mysterious entity for at least
three reasons: a) we can never see this competence, for we can only
observe specific forms of performances (e.g. prayers, liturgy, churchgoing and
other religious practices); b) it must be an interior and at the same time
inexhaustible entity, for it is considered to be based on a experiential
relation between the divine and the human person, a relation which allows
the human person in general to express religion in an endless array of
local, cultural forms; c) this competence must be an entity which in the last
resort distinguishes religion as a ultimate unique aspect of or a incomparable special layer in a human person (with a relatively autonomous character) from
so-called secular activities as politics, labour, and all other possible social
activities which are directly shaped by the context. In particular this last
conclusion is characteristic of the dominant theological view of religion and
for the classical phenomenological studies of religion. Both are clusters of
disciplines in Western Europe and in the Anglo-American world, which are
actually dependent on the assumption that religion is a sui generis aspect of human existence (McCutcheon 1997: 9, 15ff.,
127ff., 158 and passim; cf. for the methodological consequences of this
assumption: Wiebe 1999: 123-140). (Although we have to admit that Schreiter
himself tries to avoid this conclusion and ardently strives for a view on
religion in which religion is always interwoven in social-economic, political
and semantic contexts).
3. Problems
Weve now reached the high point of paradoxicality: a more or less specific way of approaching religion, a way in which one wishes to do justice to the connection with local context, can sometimes be followed with the more or less explicit assumption that the essence of religion in the last resort is disengaged from the local context.
We may surmise that this had also been made possible
by the category religion and the notion context. For both can easily
lead us to the idea that were dealing with two separate entities between
which only an external relation can be established. The category religion,
in itself a relatively recent Euro-American creation, for the first time coming
up during the Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment, seduces us to think of a
mysterious, yet well-bounded and unique inner reality (Preus 1987; Saler
1993: 10ff.). While the notion of context seduces us to view it as a relative
stable and fixed structure out there, surrounding the focal essence of
religion. And by the way, the degree of paradoxicality will increase when we
realize that the inclination to consider context as a stable and fixed structure
arises as a way of countering a risk, which very often accompanies this notion.
For as already indicated, this notion can easily lead the investigator to an
endless regression or progression, for everything has or presupposes its
context, which has or presupposes its own context, and so on, ad infinitum. In
order to stop that regression or progression, the notion can seduce us to
consider it in the last resort as a stable and fixed structure. But even if one
does not fall prey to this seductive interpretation, and if, for instance, one
wishes to define the concept of context only in terms of what it does, say only
in pragmatic terms, then there still is the almost ineradicable inclination to
view religion eventually as a sui generis
entity.
So, contextual theologians and phenomenological authors constantly feel
the necessity to switch between these views, which actually cannot be combined
or reconciled at all. This has already been discussed, sc. as the problem of
too much or too little context. We may, for instance, imagine that
whenever a contextual researcher is inclined to do justice to all the
social, material and historical forms in which religion is embedded, he/she will
at the same time try to do justice as well to the non-social, non-material and
eternal characteristics of religion. For we may definitely posit that the sui
generis view on religion robs the religious believer and the religious
community of social, material and historical life, while at the same time the
researcher knows that religion is only present and knowledgeable in a form
and a substance which is social, material, historical etc. This would actually
make social-cultural research of religion to an ever-unsatisfying zig-zag motion.
However, one can imagine the counter-argument: That this switching between views and positions is characteristic of the social scientist. Is he/she not constantly switching between insider- and outsider-position, between emic and etic etc.? This may be right. But as far as religion is concerned, and as far a religion is presupposed to be a sui generis entity in the end, this counter-argument is not valid. This presupposition makes religion mistakenly unassailable for social scientists, meanwhile tacitly designating religion as the exclusive domain for theologians and classical phenomenologists (which by the way also feeds the frustration with regard to the social-scientific spirit of research, because an area of investigation is actually considered to be excluded from research). It also spreads an unpleasant ethnocentric flavor. Why is that? There are many answers to this. We may for instance point to the sociology of religion of Max Weber, also to the masterwork of a more recent author, the French social-theorist and historian of religion Marcel Gauchet (The Disenchantment of the World: A Political History of Religion 1997). Among many brilliant observations we can find in Gauchets work the idea that the development of the modern West accelerated, just when religion was essentialized into a unique, interior matter of (mysterious) fact! It was the beginning of the Western withdrawal of religion from the daily economic, political and social praxis to the evanescent realm of the privatized and purely spiritual experiences, the beginning also of a process of accommodation of this privatized religion to whatever political or commercial ideology is dominant at a certain time. In other words: it was the beginning of secularization and privatization of religion. Now, this is definitely not meant to suggest that contextual authors on religion consciously and willingly propagate secularism. On the contrary. However, we can maintain that approaching religion in terms of a sui generis entity and as surrounded by a host of possible contexts, betrays in the background a modern Western influence. This is eventually the view that in the end religion will only exist in the inner world, not out there.
4. Local practices
Now we can draw conclusions. The attentive reader may have observed by now, that the books and papers, in which the distinction between religion and context was discussed, are pretty dated. The most important works on context and religion seem to go back to the nineteen-seventies and eighties. We may suspect that this is not a coincidence as the distinction is not a very helpful instrument in social-scientific research. This probably holds true in particular for the distinction between context and sui generis religion. Not only because of the already mentioned disadvantages that may arise, also because of a simple, although seemingly contradictory circumstance. Just because there always is a context, even a host of contexts, and because it goes without saying that we can only spot religion if we acknowledge the ingrained, internal impact of religion in certain contexts, we may take leave of the notion of context as far as religion is concerned! Superabundancy will not stimulate attentive research.
It seems advantageous to replace the notion of (local) context by the
notion of (local) practices. With respect to religion one of the more important
advantages will be, that in that case we will no longer treat religion as a
given, mysterious, essential entity, but as embedded in everyday life, as a part
of human agency (Oberoi 1994: 23). Why
precisely will such a replacement be an advantage? There are two main reasons, a
practical and a theoretical
reason.
The
practical reason is that the real
agency in everyday life, in particular with respect to a local religious
community, will be given back to this community as a whole, not to religious
experts as theologians and church leaders (cf. Reader 1994, passim). For lets
not forget: although the traditional (missionary) contextual theology often
wishes to do justice to the local community as the agent par excellence (cf.
Schreiter 1992: 16ff.), the flaw in this way of thinking is the presupposition
of sui generis religion. For this
presupposition basically determines that religion is a domain for experts in the
field of theology, religious (phenomenological) studies and church leadership.
In other words: one of the tendencies in theologically informed contextual
thinking is the tendency to consider religious experts to be the defining agents
who interpret, translate and transmit religious messages in favor of the
community, which means in the end that these experts, due to an ingrained
authoritative gesture, are still inclined to rob the local community of their
own agency.
The theoretical reason which explains the advantage of the notion of practices over the notion of context, has to do with the question where we have to locate religion. We may state that religion and we can approach it as a special kind of belief, or as a special kind of symbolic language, or even as number of sacred things, or as a ritual, or as all together is part of what Pierre Bourdieu called a habitus (Bourdieu 1977: 82f.). Habitus stands for the collectively shared, but hardly ever consciously recognized, scripts and repertoires for perceptions, remembrances and appreciations which play a role in human actions. A habitus determines what a person does in networks of social interaction, networks in which a person always finds him/herself situated (by the way: we have to take the verb determine here in a weak sense of the word; it points to an overall orientation for action, because of the multiplicity of experiences a person encounters in daily life, a habitus also undergoes constant modifications). Now, the meaning of the idea that religion is part of a habitus is, that in the just mentioned script and repertoires some kind of a reference is made to an ultimate reality or a sacred order. But, lets be attentive here. This does not imply that we can only speak of religion whenever we could spot an intellectual reference to an ultimate reality or a sacred order. No, we have to think along the lines of the old American pragmatists like William James and Charles S. Peirce: we never know whether practices with specific functions, like building a community house, healing, counseling, criticizing or legitimating policies etc. etc., are a result of bringing into practice consciously held beliefs, convictions, rituals etc; we only can detect the nature of these beliefs etc. afterwards, when weve studied the practices in which they are supposed to be embedded (Menand 2001: 351-358).
Parenthetically, we may conclude that all this has consequences for questions concerning the definition of religion. One of these consequences seems to be ambiguous. For on the one hand, we never can determine in advance what religion really is, while on the other hand, we may assume that folk definitions of religion make it quite easy to detect where religion is at stake in local practices. So, theres no need to make too much trouble in the detection of religion. However, social-scientific researchers cannot work in the long run with folk-definitions; they have to determine precisely which aspects of reality they want to study. So, in actual research, one has to look for a working definition. We have to be aware of three requirements then: a) a definition must always be polythetic, which means: it must point to a whole range of characteristics which are related by a family resemblance (Saler 1993: 158-196); b) a definition should always be used while being receptive to modifications; religion is, so to say, an ever unbounded category; c) a definition of religion is only a conceptual tool, one of the instruments to elucidate the various practices of people, it cannot be something which actually exists in reality (McCutcheon 1997).
However, lets not deal here with problems concerning definition and proceed towards the conclusion of this essay with the advantages of replacing the paradigm of religion local context by religion local practices.
As has already been indicated, the notion of context can easily drive us to think of a stable and fixed surrounding structure, say the structure of a clearly restricted, geographical area (and we may be lucky if the notion does not make us to presuppose as well that people in that restricted area form a fully homogeneous group). Whenever we fall prey to that inclination, we are also inclined to see only separation between contexts. However, the notion of practices does not bring along with it those false presuppositions. For a practice, also a localized practice, can stretch beyond a restricted geographical, cultural etc. context. We can illustrate this point with the debate on globalization and localization and the role of religion.
It is well known that globalization is an ambiguous process. It does not have one economically or politically identifiable center even the U.S. cannot be considered to be a center like that (at best a major booster). For the subject of the contemporary Empire cannot be located in one state or one nation (Hardt/Negri 2000). The inner mechanism of globalization is the constant flow of capital and power, which gives us the impression of an absence of order and an acting of chaos. Despite this purposeless character of globalization, many scholars observe two seemingly contradictory tendencies in the process/chaos of globalization: a tendency to cultural homogenization and a tendency to diversity. According to some sociologists the latter tendency is even dominant: globalization brings about the unpacking of local cultural complexes, not in the least stimulated by religiously inspired collective motivations on local levels (Lehmann 2002: 301). The paradox however, which is so difficult to understand, is that both tendencies can show themselves together, also on the local religious level. Lets think for instance of the rise of fundamentalist movements in the world religions. We may also take the conspicuous rise of Protestant Pentecostal and other Charismatic movements in the Christian part of the world as examples (and please, pay attention: Pentecostalism cannot be equated with fundamentalism, although they sometimes coincide). In both movements the local community is of utmost importance. For fundamentalism can be considered as an aggressive way of defending the special rights of the culture, the habits and routines of old (idealized) local communities, communities which are organized along patriarchal lines (Riesebrodt 1993). Also in Pentecostal circles, the local religious and geographical community plays a major part. The community functions as the mediating instrument for religious conversion and religiously inspired human life as a whole. Nevertheless, the rise of fundamentalism and Pentecostalism is at the same time a global phenomenon. Not only because of the global growth of these phenomena and because of the many cultural and religious similarities between local fundamentalist and Protestant Pentecostalist communities all over the world (homogenization), but also because we can interpret these movements as forms of protest paradox again! against globalization (Münch 1998; Schreiter 1999). In other words: were dealing with religious specimens of global anti-globalists!
What these two examples lead us to on a general methodological level, in particular the merging of globalization and localization, is the advantage from practices over context. By studying practices and the way religion is ingrained in local practices, the researcher will find, that localized movements and local communities are interwoven in supra-local networks. He/she can for instance try to delineate the ways along which Christian local religious communities are dealing with other religious communities, trying to get insight in attitudes, relations and power balances. Or he/she can try to decode the mechanisms with which local communities are criticize or for that matter obstruct, or, perhaps, legitimize, the globalizing power of the national state (for alas, most national states happen to be natural allies of the homogenizing dynamics of globalization). Only the focus on practices can be helpful then.
So,
the overall conclusion may be: lets forget
the notion of context, while recognizing that context is always abundantly
present! However, lets also be careful in social science when using the
concept of practices. The example of religious fundamentalism as a local and at
the same time global expression of certain religious practices, indicates that
in executing the real thing in social research, we still have to distinguish
between e.g positively affirming and self-defeating practices. For we can be
sure that fundamentalist practices in the end tend to destroy both the
uniqueness and the special character of every local practice. Nevertheless,
bearing this admonishment in mind, lets continue working with the
notion of local practices!*
Note
* With thanks to Dominic Cronin and Floor van Harskamp.
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